Anonymization of Text Data with Attention-Based Networks by Fischer, Lina Teresa Marie
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Faculty for Mathematics, Computer Science and Statistics
Master Thesis
Anonymization of Text Data with Attention-Based Networks
Author:
Lina Teresa Marie Fischer
Supervisor:
Prof. Dr. Christian Heumann
Matthias Aßenmacher
30th January 2020

Abstract
Anonymization of Text Data with Attention-Based Networks
The present master thesis tries to combine a concept of automatic data anonymization with a
mechanism from the field of neural networks. Since a large part of daily communication contains
very personal data, the proposed approach is tested on a large email corpus. It is the objective
to automatically replace any sensitive data allowing re-identification by, at best, thematically
close words and leave other data unchanged. The success of such an approach could save both
work and privacy concerns in the era of artificial intelligence. A basic knowledge of statistics
and machine learning is required to understand this thesis. The necessary basics concerning
the mathematical concepts of privacy and the field of neural networks are explained extensively
within the thesis.
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1 Introduction
Data security is a very current topic. Since the introduction of the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) in May 2018, there have been new legal regulations on the handling of
personal data. In GDPR, personal data are defined as all data that can be attributed to a
(natural) person [(20), Ch.1, Art.4]. Of course, the risk to disclose personal data is minimized if
all personal data is deleted or not even collected but this approach is incomplete. Its incomplete-
ness lies in that it ignores the accompanying loss of valuable, non-personal data and also the
frequent necessity of data collection for research. An example of this is medical research, which
could greatly benefit from the use of patient records or the area of product development that
depends on user experience. However in the case of Amazon’s Alexa, the unfiltered collection
of this data has so far posed an unmanageable security risk, as it does not even only the device
listen but also Amazon employees [(40)]. Even if technological and political progress manages
to prevent unintended eavesdropping, there lies a general risk in sending personal data like one’s
position to a corporate server. Any servers can be a target for hackers, who can conveniently
find an aggregation of sensitive data there. As a countermeasure, the GDPR proposes privacy
by design. Privacy by design means to include a privacy mechanism within the technology to
prevent, in respect of the purpose, unnecessary, personal data to be saved in the first place [(20),
ch.4, Art.25]. Obviously, there is no simple solution as for instance not transmitting the position
may disable Alexa to respond to a request. The central dilemma in data security gets obvious:
How can data be private while still contain core information?
One solution could be the usage of anonymized data. Anonymization techniques reaching a
trade-off between both objectives even hold further advantages. For instance, when it comes to
image recognition like damage detection on cars. If the mechanism learned which car belongs
to whom instead of the examination of accident tracks it would not be extendable to images of
different people’s cars. If anonymized data were used the mechanism would be forced to focus
on the individual damage instead of individual car holders.
Besides the advantages in terms of generalization, intelligent solutions in the area of anonymiza-
tion are beneficial for several parties: they allow the partial use of confidential data for research
purposes while at the same time they protect the data security of the individual. The topic of
this master thesis is the handling of the conflict between the usability of data and the degree
of anonymization incorporating two different mathematical areas: The concepts of differential
privacy as intelligent anonymization definition and self-attention, a recent development in
the area of neural networks enabling a network to learn to focus on different parts of the input
data at different points in time.
1
2 Methods and related approaches
2.1 Privacy and Automation
2.1.1 Earlier Privacy Approaches
The privacy concept used within the application part of this master thesis is so-called dif-
ferential privacy. However, before its introduction there were several simpler concepts of
anonymization. Three of them will be described below. All of them try to reach a trade-off
between privacy and data utility which constitutes the central challenge in the area of data
anonymization. The reason therefore lies in the fact that in general, the utility declines when
the level of privacy rises. Assume for example that a study on the efficacy of administered drugs
in autoimmune diseases is to be conducted at a clinic. In order to create a representative study,
a large number of patient records are required. In contrast, autoimmune diseases are very rare.
Trying to collect new information for the study would be very expensive on the one hand and
very inefficient on the other hand, since the information required already exists in the form of
medical records at many different medical institutions. However, these files cannot simply be
passed on for reasons of confidentiality. Instead, at least all specific information such as name,
place of residence, age and sex should be concealed. This is essential, as there are already studies
that show that people can be identified directly by the three attributes gender, date of birth and
postal code [(42)]. But it is precisely these attributes that can also provide valuable information
about the effectiveness of a drug. For example, side effects affecting the circulation certainly
correlate with age. The place of residence can also provide information about special dietary
requirements or location specific diseases. Simply deleting this data may lead to a loss of in-
formation and therefore data utility. In contrast, the mere mitigation of the informative degree
of the data (for example, using intervals “between 75 and 85” instead of “80 years old”) may
preserve those information but not sufficiently conceal the identity and hence lack an adequate
level of privacy. As the level of privacy is to be maximized while the decrease in data utility
shall be minimized the general problem can be formalised the following statement:
minutility loss maxdegree of privacy
But in order to optimize the levels of privacy and utility, a way to measure both of them
must be determined first. This section explains anonymization strategies built on mathematical
definitions with hyperparameters to be tuned.
The following descriptions of k-anonymity, l-diversity and t-closeness are all based on [(9)].
k-anonymity
The idea of k-anonymity is to make amendments to each observation in a way such that it ”is
indistinguishable from at least k − 1 other records“ [(9), p.2]. So, it tries to offer privacy by
hiding individuality in homogeneous groups of at least k members. These groups result from
”generalization“ or ”suppression“ of attributes that serve to identify individuals [(9), p.2]. k is
serving as the hyperparameter regulating the trade-off between privacy and utility. The more
adapted records are linked to one original record, the more privacy is introduced. The sentence
”John Age 80 has Alzheimer“
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is used in [(9)] to illustrate measures and is adopted here also. In order to apply suppression,
the name ”John“ is then replaced by ’NA’, but randomly choosing a different name from ”John“
but used in the database would have worked just as well. The diagnosis ”Alzheimer“ must also
be replaced and can be generalised with the term ”dementia“. The resulting sentence then reads
”’NA‘ Age 80 has dementia“.
Whether further attributes should be replaced depends on the reached indistinguishability. If
there are k−1 other people of Age 80 with a dementia diagnosis they protect each other with their
identical appearance as there are k original records equally linked to the anonymized record.
Unfortunately, it is emphasized that ”adversaries that use background knowledge“ and data
sets with quite similar row entries represent exceptions where k-anonymity failed to prevent re-
identification [(9), p.2]. This is rather conclusive as in a database where only John has dementia
not much information is hidden.
l-diversity
l-diversity extends k-anonymity in a way such that a large enough variety of sensitive attributes
is provided. The recipe is to ensure that ”there are at least l ”well-represented“ values for each
confidential attribute“[(9), p.2]. In this technique, the number of required possible replacements
l corresponds to the hyperparameter - the more variety, the more privacy but the less potential
utility. In the case that there are not l different replacements, it is necessary to invent new
replacements. But this has a negative influence on the data quality as the underlying data
structure is violated. Taking the example from above, and wishing to replace the name ”John“
with a different name, either a re-identification is facilitated if there are only two possible
replacements or inconsistencies may arise as there are now l names instead of 3. An example for
such an inconsistency may be that several diagnoses for one patient could be torn into several
diagnoses for several patients which is confounding the facts. Hence, l-diversity does not solve
k-anonymity’s drawbacks completely. Additionally, the introduced bias and possibly too high
similarity among the outcome records are said to counteract the usability of the approach. Thus
there is also room for improvement in this technique.
t-closeness
The violation of the underlying data structure when applying l-diversity to a data set is found
to be reflected best in missing ”semantic closeness“[(9), p.2]. On the hypothesis that semantic
proximity can be measured by the proximity of the distributions of the previous and adjusted
attributes, t-closeness proposes to limit the distance between the distributions to t. t then cor-
responds to the hyperparameter regulating the trade-off between privacy and utility. The higher
the discrepancy in distributions the higher the privacy but the lower the utility in consequence.
In comparison to k-anonymity and l-diversity, t-closeness is able to produce an anonymous
dataset. However, it is stated that “sometimes it is at the expense of the correlations”[(9),
p.2], as the forced distribution will change some relations. While this may disguise personal
information it may also influence the data utility.
All three methods are said to either lack strategies to find optimal values or have so far been
described as excessively computationally expensive. Below, the concept of differential privacy
is explained. This method discards high computational effort and is automated more easily,
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thereby tackling some of the problems faced by the methods above. Still, the choice of suitable
hyperparameters is left to the applicant.
2.1.2 Differential Privacy
All descriptions concerning differential privacy are based on [(1)] and [(13)].
The main concept of differential privacy is to change the outcome of a trained model by adding
noise in a fashion such that removing single individuals from the training data does no longer
affect the outcome remarkably. In other words, the goal is to prevent any re-identification by
hiding all individuality. Instead, the likeliness of any result shall be influenced by a tiny factor
only. In the following, D and D′ are datasets whose L1-distance is less than 1 (||D−D′||1 < 1).
Definition. ((-δ)-Differential Privacy) [(1), p.17]
For , δ ≥ 0 and any two data sets D and D′ a function (mechanism)M : D → Rd mapping a
dataset D to a probability fulfills (− δ)-differential privacy if
P(M(D) ∈ S) ≤ e · P(M(D′) ∈ S) + δ (1)
for all S ⊆ Range(M).
Obviously, for (, δ) = 0, both P(M(D) ∈ S) ≤ P(M(D′) ∈ S) and P(M(D′) ∈ S) ≤ P(M(D) ∈
S) are valid and it follows that
P(M(D) ∈ S) = P(M(D′) ∈ S). (2)
So the more similar D and D′ are, the more indistinguishable outcome produces the differentially
private mechanism.
Remark 1. (Privacy Budget) [(13), p.4]
The value pair (, δ) controls the amount of privacy and is therefore referred to as Privacy
Budget. The pair corresponds to the hyperparameters in differential privacy.
In general, δ is often discarded and only  is used to adjust the degree of privacy. As a conse-
quence, a mechanism is called -differential private then.
Remark 2. [(13), p.4]
Depending on whether the privacy budget is applied on the total or a specific subset of all
individuals, there is a distinction between global and personalized privacy budget.
Differential privacy is achieved with the application of an (, δ)-differentially-private mechanism.
Here, two mechanisms are specifically relevant: the Laplace Mechanism and the Gaussian
Mechanism. Both are described in terms of numeric queries f : N|X | → Rk together with
their according privacy guarantees. All descriptions concerning the Laplace mechanism follow
[(1), p.31-32] if not indicated differently.
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Definition. (Laplace Mechanism)
For an arbitrary f : N|X | → Rk, the Laplace Mechanism is defined as
MLap(x, f(·), ) = f(x) + (Y1, ...Yk), (3)
where Yi i.i.d∼ Lap(∆f

), i ∈ {1, ..., k} .
Here, ∆f corresponds to the L1-sensitivity of f :
∆f = max
x,y ∈N|X|, ||x−y||1=1
||f(x)− f(y)||1. (4)
Furthermore, a random variable X is distributed according to a zero-centered Laplace prob-
ability density with scale parameter b if
X ∼ Lap(x|b) = 12b exp(−
|x|
b
). (5)
Theorem 1.
The Laplace mechanism is differentially private with privacy budget (, 0).
The corresponding proof is also provided here for better understanding.
Proof. Let x, y ∈ N|X | be such that ||x− y||1 ≤ 1. Let px and py denote the probability density
induced by MLap(x, f(·), ) respectively MLap(y, f(·), ). Then, for z ∈ Rk aribtrary:
MLap(x, f(·), )(z)
MLap(y, f(·), )(z) ∼
px(z)
py(z)
=
k∏
i=1
exp− |f(x)i−zi|∆f
exp− |f(y)i−zi|∆f
=
k∏
i=1
exp
(
(|f(y)i − zi| − |f(x)i − zi|)
∆f
)
triangle ineq.
≤
k∏
i=1
exp
(−(|f(x)i − f(y)i|)
∆f
)
= exp
(
||f(x)− f(y)||1
∆f
)
≤ exp () .
(6)
In the third step, the so-called triangle equality could be applied as | · | represents a metric. Be-
cause it will be needed for further understanding, a short revision is provided here in accordance
with [(41)].
A metric evaluates distances and refers to a measure d incorporating three attributes:
1. d(x, x) = 0 and d(x, y) = 0 =⇒ x = y (self-reflexivity),
2. d(x, y) = d(y, x) (symmetry) and
3. d(x, y) + d(y, z) ≥ d(x, z) (triangle equality).
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In the case that d(x, y) = 0 does not necessarily indicate x = y, d does not denote a metric but
a pseudo-metric [(13), p.4].
The Gaussian mechanism works in a similar way, but as the name suggests a Gaussian noise
variable is added instead of a Laplace variable.
All information concerning the Gaussian Mechanism is taken from [(1), p.53]. In contrast to
the L1-sensitivity used in the Laplace mechanism, the L2-sensitivity constitutes a part in the
definition of a differential-private Gaussian mechanism. It is defined as
∆2f = max
x,y ∈N|X|, ||x−y||=1
||f(x)− f(y)||2, (7)
where || · ||2 indicates the corresponding 2-norm, usually the euclidean norm.
Definition. (Gaussian Mechanism)
The following mechanism
MGaussian(x, f(·), σ) = f(x) + (Y1, ..., Yk), (8)
where each Yi i.i.d∼ N (0, σ2), for i ∈ {1, ..., k}, is called Gaussian Mechanism.
Theorem 2. For any  ∈ (0, 1), the Gaussian noise mechanism is (, δ)-private if
c2 > 2 ln 1.25
δ
(9)
and
σ ≥ c · ∆2(f)

. (10)
The according proof follows a similar structure than the above proof and is therefore discarded
here.
Both mechanisms provide the understanding that differential privacy works because a zero-
centered noise distribution is added to the true data generating distribution pdata and conse-
quently blurring the boundaries between different classes like user names. The formulation in
terms of numerical queries refers to one of the most common types of data in need of anonymiza-
tion, namely tables containing integers. Nonetheless, the definitions may be extended to con-
tinuous data in an obvious way but in settings involving unstructured data different definitions
may be of use.
2.1.3 (Paper) Generalised Differential Privacy for Text Document Processing
While the above descriptions are advantageous in that they are formulated in sort of a general
way and rather easily computed in comparison to preceding alternatives, the anonymization of
text data holds some characteristics that require adjustment. In (21), an approach of author
obfuscation on a task published on the platform PAN@Clef is described. As the anonymiza-
tion algorithm within the application section of this thesis is mainly based on this paper, the
additional privacy definitions are presented here along with the approach.
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For the input text, a so-called “bag-of-words representation” (bow) is used. This representation
reduces the input text but does interestingly neither prevent author re-identification nor topic
classification. A bag-of-words representation of a document simply lists the unique words
used together with their respective frequency while other attributes as for instance the order are
discarded. Taking the following example sentence
„Deep down in the ocean, small fish clean the mouths of large fish. “
the corresponding bag of words looks as follows:
{„Deep“: 1,
„down“: 1,
„in“: 1,
„the“: 2,
„ocean“: 1,
„small“: 1,
„fish“: 2,
„clean“: 1,
„mouths“: 1,
„of“: 1,
„large“: 1}.
Here, the article „the“ is used twice but is not likely to reveal relevant information. This applies
to all so-called stopwords, mostly „prepositions, pronouns and articles“ [(21),p.5], and hence
they are often discarded when it comes to bag-of-words or text representations in general. In
the approach presented, the researchers also deleted stopwords during construction of the bags.
The ultimate goal of the paper is to
„provide a mechanism which changes the input without disturbing its topic classification, but
that the author can no longer be identified“ for „a(n) given (...) input bag-of-words
representation of a text document“. [(21), p.2]
Therefore, a privacy framework for unstructured data as text is necessary to evaluate amend-
ments made to the original data. A modification of differential privacy, so-called dX -privacy is
explained first. It is then further extended to contain a measure of topic-relatedness of two bags
of words b and b′ and finally used to find a mechanismM transforming b and b′ into differentially
private representationsM(b),M(b′).
First, the extension of differential privacy is described. While the former formulation of dif-
ferential privacy refers in a rather general way to sets of data points, a different formulation
is advantageous for unstructured data as text. With dX -privacy „a metric-based extension of
differential privacy “ [(21), p.2] was developed.
In order to be able to apply mathematical operations on words or characters, a word vector
representation Vec is trained first. A representation of this kind is called word embedding
and will be explained in a later section. At this point it is sufficient to know, that there simply
is a distinct vector representation for each unique word and a document can be represented by
the set of all vectors corresponding to the words contained.
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In the paper recited, distances between words w1, w2 are evaluated by comparing the distances
between their representation vectors Vec(w1), Vec(w2):
dVec(w1, w2) := d(Vec(w1), Vec(w2)). (11)
Consequently, if the distance measure d fulfills the necessary conditions of a pseudo-metric, so
does dV ec. It must be emphasized that measuring semantic resemblance with spatial proximity
is only useful if the word vector space indeed reflects relations between words. As explained in a
later chapter, word embeddings like Word2Vec, FastText and GloVe indeed manage to capture
semantics.
In comparison to differential privacy, dX -privacy incorporates the idea that the degree of privacy
mainly depends on the spatial distance between a data set and its anonymized equivalent. Again,
it is therefore required that the embedding reflects semantic properties. Below, BX describes
the set of all bags-of-words and D(BX ) the set of possible probability distributions over the bag-
of-words space. As previously emphasized, the application of a differentially private mechanism
corresponds to the rearrangement of an input in relation to a distribution. Hence, every privacy
mechanism M maps b ∈ BX to the probability space D(BX ): M : BX → D(BX ). In the
following,M(b)(Z) describes the probability that amendments to b made by the mechanismM
result in a representation contained in the subset Z ⊆ BX . With a valid choice of metric or
pseudo-metric as dX , dX -privacy can be defined. The below definition is derived from [(32), p.3]
as the definition was not contained in [(13)] and was furthermore adapted to the case.
Definition. (dX -privacy)
Let dX define a (pseudo-)metric on the vector space containing the word embedding. A mecha-
nismM : BX → D(BX ) is called dX -private if
M(b)(Z) ≤ edX (b,b′)M(b′)(Z) (12)
for any bags of words b, b′ and any subset Z ⊆ BX .
Obviously it would be beneficial to determine the distance of the topics of two documents. E.g.,
the Earth Mover’s Metric measures the difference in topics of two inputs. Its definition as
the solution to a transport optimization problem is presented below.
Definition. (Earth-Mover’s Distance)
For two bag-of-words representations X and Y and a (pseudo-)metric dS on the set of finite
bags S, the Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD) solves
EdS (X,Y ) := min
F
∑
xi ∈X
∑
yj ∈Y
dS(xi, yj)Fij (13)
under the following constraints:
1.
n∑
i=1
Fij =
bj
|Y |
2.
l∑
j=1
Fij =
ai
|X| , Fij ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ l.
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Here, a bag of words X (Y ) is of the form
X = {xa11 , xa22 , ..., xakk } (resp. Y = {yb11 , yb22 , ..., ybll }),
where there are k different words in X and l different words in Y . Fij corresponds to an entry in
a so-called flow matrix F ∈ Rk×l≥0 indicating „the (non-negative) amount of flow from xi ∈ X
to yj ∈ Y “[(21), p.4]. A flow-matrix loosely refers to how many words in X flow to one word in
Y in order to transform X into Y . Its values are usually part of the linear optimization problem
whose solution is given by the Earth Mover’s Distance. However, in the case that |X| = |Y |, it
can be shown that
Fij =
1 for i = j0 for i 6= j. (14)
For |X| = |Y | the Earth Mover’s Distance corresponds to a pseudometric. This pseudometric is
called Earth Mover’s Metric.
Example.
To illustrate how the EMD is calculated, three bags of size 5 are compared to each other. Let
F be the optimal flow matrix
F =

1
5 0 0 0 0
0 15 0 0 0
0 0 15 0 0
0 0 0 15 0
0 0 0 0 15

(15)
For three sentences the difference in topic shall be evaluated.
a) „This year the winter in France begins early.“
b) „In 2019, snow fell in Italy before Christmas.“
c) „On the continent, melted snow is also called water .“
After stopword removal, the three sentences constitute the following bags-of-words:
a) b1 = {year, winter, France, begins, early}
b) b2 = {2019, snow, fell, Italy, Christmas}
c) b3 = {continent, melted, snow, called, water}
To be able, to calculate vector distances, a vector representation must be found for all trained
words first. For the sake of simplicity, the word vectors of Google’s Word2Vec model are used.
When setting d to be the Euclidean metric
||xi − yi||2 =
√√√√ ∑
1≤k≤n
(
x
(k)
i − y(k)i
)2
, (16)
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the distance in topic between b1 and b2 is calculated as
Ed(b1, b2) =
1
5 · (d(year, 2019) + d(winter, snow) + d(France, fell)
+ d(begins, Italy) + d(early,Christmas)).
Using the pretrained Word2Vec Embedding with 300−dimensional vectors, the Earth-Mover’s-
Metric between the bags of words corresponds to Ed(b1, b2) = 3.3296, Ed(b1, b3) = 3.6710 and
Ed(b2, b3) = 4.0060. The Earth-Mover’s Metric therefore supports the intuitive decision that b1
and b2 are closer related in topic.
Now, the calculation of the Earth Mover’s Metric is shown but the adaptation of differential
privacy to a privacy term incorporating topic-relatedness is still outstanding. The incorporation
of topic-relatedness is desirable because of two reasons. On the one hand, remaining topic-
relatedness corresponds to preserved data utility in terms of content similarity. On the other
hand, distance in topic-relatedness causes masking of the authorship and consequently a certain
level of privacy. Consequently, this term of privacy already incorporates a trade-off between
privacy and utility. In the below definition, the (pseudo-)metric dX is simply replaced with the
Earth Mover’s Metric EdX induced by dX .
Definition. (Earth-Mover’s Privacy)
For a data set X , a (pseudo-)metric dX on X , a mechanism M : BX → D(BX ) is called
EdX -private iff
M(b)(Z) ≤ eEdX (b,b′)M(b′)(Z) (17)
for all b, b′ ∈ BX and Z ⊆ BX . EdX refers to the Earth Mover’s Metric with dX as distance
metric.
Up to this point, no dX -private mechanism incorporating a privacy-related measure is provided.
Its derivation is part of the application chapter. A different approach describing the adaptation
of differential privacy to text data is explained as part of the embedding section. As the training
of embedding spaces depends on neural networks, their architecture is explained before.
2.2 Deep Learning with Neural Networks
A basic introduction to machine learning is presumed in order to follow this master thesis.
Nevertheless, some of the main ideas are briefly recapitulated in accordance with [(7), ch.5].
One of the main challenges in machine learning is to make sure that a good balance between
model complexity and generalization error is found when selecting the model. Either the model
may underfit and not be able to represent the training data properly or it is trained in a way too
focused on the training data and overfit as it does not generalize well to previously unknown test
data. The trade-off is mainly controlled over the model’s capacity which indicates the model’s
ability to represent complex relationships. The number of trainable parameters indicates a
degree of complexity, as the model is the more flexible the more parameters there are. However,
this flexibility also leads to a more exact adaptation to the training data and consequently the
model produces worse results for previously unseen observations. The typical setup is illustrated
in the figure below.
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Figure 1: „Typical Relationship Between Capacity and Error“ [(7), ch.5, p.113]
Deep learning is a subarea of machine learning setting new standards regarding the number
of parameters used and therefor inheriting the susceptibility to overfitting and underfitting.
As in machine learning, deep learning also tries to address this problem by the application of
regularization techniques. And also in other respects the strategy for finding the best model
corresponds to the usual procedure. First, a suitable model class must be chosen, then a loss
function has to be selected that adequately reflects the objectives of the learning process and
finally optimization methods for loss minimization and consequently parameter optimization
must be picked out.
Now follows a description of the motivation for the use of the model class of neural networks,
as well as of its functionality and fundamentally important (or especially for this master thesis
important) concepts concerning optimization. The subsequent explanations regarding the area
of deep learning are all based on [(7), ch.6] and [(8)] if not indicated differently.
The term deep learning refers to all machine learning methods involving neural networks.
While most other typical machine learning methods are able to tackle tasks requiring linear
feature transformations only, its necessity lies in the strength of finding non-linear representa-
tions. XOR states a simple example of a classification problem in need of a non-linear decision
boundary.
Figure 2: The XOR Problem Statement (inspired by [(8), ch.1]
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The input space X consists of four different observations:
X = {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)} (18)
The figure shows that obviously no linear decision boundary is able to distinguish between the
orange and blue samples without the systematical misclassification of one observation. The
correct classification looks as follows:
(x1, x2) y
(0, 0) False
(0, 1) True
(1, 0) True
(1, 1) False
The labels must be encoded to numbers and y is binary encoded here: y = (0, 1, 1, 0)T . Obvi-
ously, a transformation of the input space is needed. The following small neural network is able
to perform this transformation.
Figure 3: Neural Network for XOR Problem Statement (inspired by [(8), ch.1])
The figure shows the general structure of neural networks consisting of input neurons, hidden
neurons and output neurons. Another common term for neuron is cell. Neurons are not
randomly put in the same layer but all neurons in the same layer are computed in parallel.
While one hidden layer is sufficient to model the XOR problem, usually there are several hidden
layers. A possible model structure containing several hidden layers is displayed below.
Figure 4: Neural Network with Several Hidden Layers and Multiple Output Neurons (Own Illustration)
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Several output neurons are sometimes necessary, for example if it comes to multiclass classi-
fication. Between all layers there are directed connections which are basically the product of
the previous neuron’s output and a corresponding weight. Afterwards, a so-called activation
function is applied to the weighted value. The output value of each hidden neuron in the i-th
layer is calculated as [(34), p.227]
z
(i)
j = f
(
M∑
k=1
w
(i)
kj · z(i−1)k + w(i)k0
)
(19)
where f indicates the activation function inside the cell, zi−1k refers to the output of the k-th
neuron in the previous ((i − 1)-th) layer and w(i)kj denotes the weighting of z(i−1)k in the j-th
neuron of the i − th layer. w(i)kj hence describes the weight along the connection from the k-th
neuron in layer i− 1 to the j-th neuron in layer i. With w(i)k0 the corresponding bias in the i-th
layer is denoted. The following illustration aims to visualize the notation for a network involving
a bias term in each linear projection.
Figure 5: Neural Network with Notations of Cells and Connections (inspired by [(8), ch.1])
In the above formula, the previous hidden layer consists ofM neurons, hence k ∈ {1, ...,M}. The
choice of the applied activation function is arbitrary as long as the function is differentiable and
non-linear. Nevertheless, those functions should be elected with regard to the desired output.
The subsequent section about activation functions is additionally oriented in [(30), p.13-14].
In general, activation functions can be divided into threshold functions and sigmoidal func-
tions. Threshold functions are functions applying different operations to values below and above
a threshold. A very common activation function of this kind is
ReLU(z) = max(z, 0), (20)
the REctified Linear Unit. Activation functions are applied not only inside hidden layers but
also in the output layer and therefore they determine the output type. Threshold functions are
a good choice if the model outputs scores and no continuous transformation is needed. In case
that the output values are preferred to be squashed in between a range [a, b] in a continuous
way, a sigmoidal function is the activation function of choice. All sigmoidal functions ψ are
monotonous and
lim
z→−∞ψ(z) = a and limz→∞ψ(z) = b. (21)
13
Due to this restriction, such functions inherit an S-shaped curve. The most prominent example
of a sigmoid is the logistic sigmoid:
ψ(z) = 11 + exp(−αz) . (22)
Here, α is a control parameter with effect on the slope. The logistic sigmoid outputs values
between 0 and 1 and is therefore suited to be interpreted as a probability. Its choice is common
in binary-classification tasks, however in multiclass classification use of the softmax activation
is preferable:
softmax(z)(k)i =
exp(z(k)i )∑
j
exp(z(k)j )
(23)
Within softmax activation, the value of one unit zi is related to the values of all units in the same
layer. Another example for a frequently used sigmoid is the hyperbolic tangent function
ψ(z) = tanh z. (24)
This function maps values in [−1, 1] insted of [0, 1].
In the XOR example, the input consists of two features and hence there are two input neurons.
ReLU is chosen as activation function in the hidden layer and no activation function (respectively
id(z) = z as activation function) is selected for the output layer of the XOR model. In fact, the
classification problem is now modeled with a regression model as there is a linear output unit
and not a sigmoid.
Let
W (1) =
w(1)11 w(1)21
w
(1)
12 w
(1)
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 = (1 1
1 1
)
, W (1)0 =

0 −1
0 −1
0 −1
0 −1
, W (2) =
(
1
−2
)
and W (2)0 =

0
0
0
0
,
then
zpred = max(XW (1) +W (1)0 , 0)W (2) +W
(2)
0 (25)
This is a chained function whose depth depends on the number of hidden layers. A neural net-
work with n hidden layers can be evaluated as a chain of n+1 activation functions, each applied
on a weighted sum of inputs from the previous layer. All weights are part of the optimization
problem but must be initialized. The matrix notation of the weights enables easy parallel com-
putation for all observations in X:
max


0 0
0 1
1 0
1 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
X
(
1 1
1 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
W
+

0 −1
0 −1
0 −1
0 −1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
W0
, 0

·
(
1
−2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
W (2)
+ 0︸︷︷︸
W
(2)
0
= (26)
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max


0 0
1 1
1 1
2 2
+

0 −1
0 −1
0 −1
0 −1
 , 0
 ·
(
1
−2
)
=

max(0, 0) max(−1, 0)
max(1, 0) max(0, 0)
max(1, 0) max(0, 0)
max(2, 0) max(1, 0)
 ·
(
1
−2
)
=

0 0
1 0
1 0
2 1
 ·
(
1
−2
)
=

0
1
1
0
 , which meets exactly the solution to the XOR problem.
(27)
A small neural network was able to solve an earlier as intractable described issue. The property
as a universal approximator is illustrated here and represents one of the greatest advantages
of neural networks. More precisely, the Universal Approximation Theorem states that a
neural network with only one hidden layer is in fact capable of expressing any function. There
are still limitations to this universality, as for many functions the suitable network structure
contains a huge number of parameters or the model is not necessarily able to learn the corre-
sponding parameters. But the theorem certainly shows that neural networks technically enable
the representation of far more complex models.
2.2.1 Input Shapes
The first layer of a neural network is always the input layer whose number of neurons corre-
sponds to the input dimensionality. This seems quite straight-forward if the inputs are the
four-dimensional vectors from the XOR example. However, images, videos, text or audio data
have a different dimension, which must also be considered in the input layer. If, for example,
an image is to be displayed numerically, this initially results intuitively in a matrix displaying
pixels as entries. Consequently, the matrix dimension corresponds to length × width. But this
matrix lacks any information about the color of the individual pixels. An additional axis is
necessary to bring the color of the pixels into play. Each pixel and thus each matrix entry then
gets an additional dimension with the corresponding RGB values. A color image of size 64× 64
has then the shape (64, 64, 3) and contains therefore 64 × 64 × 3 = 12228 values. In addition,
usually a batch of samples is input, as in the XOR example when several vector samples were
read in (combined into a matrix). A fourth dimension is necessary then and the resulting input
shape will correspond to (batch size , 64, 64, 3).
In the application part of this thesis, text data is processed only. The representation of text
data depends on the encoding of its features which are usually words or n-grams (collections
of n characters). A simple way is the use of one-hot-encoding if there is a low number of
unique words (n-grams) only. In one-hot-encoding, each of n words (n-grams) is assigned an n-
dimensional unit vector. However, if there is a larger vocabulary, the use of a trained embedding
is recommended for text. Embeddings of this kind will be described later in detail as part of
the section about embeddings. At this point it is sufficient to know that in an embedding all
features are represented by vectors and that the vector size is usually much smaller than the
cardinality of the vocabulary. So, when it comes to text, the input shape is determined by the
batch size, the number of features and lastly the size of the embedding vector. The figure below
aims to illustrate how to imagine a word as a vector.
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Figure 6: Encoding Words as Vectors (Own Illustration, Left: Trained Embedding, Right: One-Hot-Encoding)
The representation of a sentence (or a document or another cohesive list of words) as a whole is
the collection of all vector representations of the contained words.
Figure 7: Matrix Representation of a Sentence (Own Illustration)
Finally, the input batch consists of several sentences (a sequence of matrices) that constitute
one tensor.
Figure 8: Text Input as Tensor (Own Illustration)
Whether text or not, any categorical output must also be encoded. Again, one-hot-encoding
represents a possibility as well as any different less dimensional but distinct representation.
2.2.2 Optimization
All information in this section is based on [(4)], [(6), ch.9], [(7), ch.8] and [(8), ch.2].
A neural network can only solve a specific task if its weights have been optimized specifically
for the problem at hand. If one has already decided to present the problem with the help of a
network and thus answered the question of representation, it is necessary to find a suitable loss
function. This loss function should punish misstatements of the network during the optimization
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process and reward correct predictions. Since the ultimate goal is to model a probability distri-
bution for given observations as realistically as possible, the neural network approach can also
be described as an attempt to estimate the true data generating distribution pdata. In statistics,
the parameters of a density function selected for a problem are determined using given observa-
tions. This approach is referred to as Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE), however
its revision is no part of this thesis. However, from the MLE the preference for optimizing the
concave log-likelihood is taken. In terms of a cost or loss function, the (convex) negative log-
likelihood reflects well the requirements for the optimal parameters, since it assumes very large
values for observations considered unlikely or impossible under the presumed data generating
process pdata:
pdata(x|γ)→ 0 =⇒ −l(x) = − log pdata(x|γ)→∞ (28)
In addition, during the optimization process, those parameters γ should be favored which are
as likely as possible with respect to the given observations x ∈ X . And indeed, the negative
log-likelihood function −l(x) assumes the lowest cost for these parameters.
However, the model shall not be evaluated for one observation x only. The expected cost caused
by applying the model f on all given observations compared to the true pdata measures the
quality of model parameters in a comprehensible manner. This value is referred to as risk R(f).
For instance, in a supervised setting where the model f aims to simulate the joint distribution
of observed data points x ∈ X and corresponding observed labels y ∈ Y based on a training
set of observed (x, y)-pairs, the risk R incorporating the negative log likelihood −l(x) as loss
function L(f(X), Y ) looks as follows:
R(f) = Ex∼pdata L(f(X), Y ) = −Ex∼pdata log(pdata(x|γ)) (29)
This function also measures the so-called cross-entropy loss between a model and the true data
distribution pdata. The term has its origin in information theory and corresponds to evaluating
how much information is lost when a distribution is “encoded” with another distribution.
If pdata was known, the attempt to model the distribution would not consist of a learning proce-
dure taking training samples as input and optimizing weights in sort of a trial-and-error manner.
It is the specifics of machine learning challenges that there is no knowledge of the underlying
distribution. Consequently, the risk minimization results in empirical risk minimization
and the empirical mean is evaluated instead (implicitly evaluating the mean according to the
empirical data distribution pˆdata):
Remp(f) = 1|X|
∑
x∈X
L(y|f(x)) (30)
The loss functions’ attempt to minimize the distance between the true underlying data generating
process pdata and the distribution simulated by the model is crucial. Distance measures as L1
and L2, respectively the Mean Squared Error (MSE) or Mean Absolute Error (MAE)
are common choices in regression tasks while the cross-entropy loss is the most popular loss
in classification tasks. Their choice is no coincidence, all of them can be traced back to the
optimization of a negative log-likelihood loss.
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There are more loss functions and the decision should be taken anew for each task, on the one
hand with respect to the learning objective and on the other hand with respect to properties in
terms of optimization. Also, the negative log-likelihood is a rather exact method which therefore
increases the risk of overfitting. In this respect, surrogate loss functions which hold a similar
objective but discard some precision represent a precaution.
An iterative optimization approach is necessary in order to minimize the empirical risk. In this
respect, gradient descent methods are attractive procedures and described next.
The Gradient Descent Method
For an arbitrary, differentiable and unrestricted function f a minimum xopt can be determined
via a descent method. A descent method is characterized by
f(xk+1) < f(xk) for all k < kopt
and equality is fulfilled for k ≥ kopt. The Gradient descent algorithm represents a prominent
way to use the descent information derivation provides to find a minimum. The idea behind
gradient based optimization can easily be illustrated with the help of a wanderer lost in the
mountains. In desperation, the hiker wants to find the valley (the global minimum of the moun-
tain’s surroundings) only by the fastest route. He therefore decides from now on to strictly follow
the path of the steepest descent. Whenever he sees an opportunity to follow an even steeper
downward path, he adjusts his route. In this respect, the wanderer even has something ahead
of the gradient descent algorithm, as will be explained later. For a differentiable function, the
direction of the steepest descent corresponds to its gradient. The following algorithm describes
the stepwise determination of the optimal direction and consecutive adaptation of the search
route for a differentiable function f .
Algorithm (Gradient Descent)
1: Init θ0 = θ ∈ dom(f)
2: for (stopping criterion is not fulfilled)
3. ∇ θi = −∇f(θi)
4. Find optimal step size i
5: Update θi+1 = θi + i · ∇θi.
6: end for
When applying batch gradient descent optimization, the gradient is computed with respect
to the complete training data. This is costly and supports overfitting. It is therefor useful to
divide the whole training set (one epoch) into several smaller batches, so-called mini-batches.
In general, the use of the terms batch and mini-batch is not consistent in literature.
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD)
Batch gradient descent optimization suffers from different peculiarities. As mentioned above,
one of them is overfitting as it converges to exactly zero at a minimum. This minimum is the
perfect fit for the training data but not necessarily an overall good fit. Stochastic Gradient
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Descent however introduces noise into the learning process by sampling the observations used
to compute the gradient randomly and consequently aggravates finding the perfect minimum.
Algorithm (Stochastic Gradient Descent)
1: Require: Learning rate schedule 1, 2,...
2: Require: Initial parameter θ
3. Init k = 1
4. while stopping criterion not met do
5: Sample a mini-batch of m examples from the training set {x(1), ..., x(m)}
with corresponding targets y(i).
6: Compute gradient estimate: gˆ = 1m∇θ
∑
i
L(f(x(i); θ), y(i))
7: Apply update: θ = θ − k · gˆ
8: k = k + 1
9: end while
Recalling the example of the wanderer, the learning rate corresponds to the length of the track
followed before adjusting the direction. While the wanderer will do so using his consciousness, it
is more difficult to incorporate the adaptation of the step size into a gradient descent algorithm.
A learning rate schedule often incorporates the following procedure: For k ∈ {1, ..., τ} ”it is
common to decay the learning rate linearly“ [(7), p.291] according to
k = (1− α)0 + αr = (1− k
τ
) · 0 + k
τ
· r. (31)
After iteration τ , a fixed learning rate  is used.
A suitable learning rate is best elected by the comparison of several learning curves. A learning
curve shows the values of the objective function, more precisely, the empirical risk over time.
However, behind the selection of the best learning rate there is a whole science of its own. Of
course it is advantageous to adapt the learning rate with respect to the iterations instead of
using a fixed schedule. The technical part of this thesis uses ADAM as ”adaptive learning
rate optimization algorithm“ [(7), p.305]. In order to understand ADAM, its components are
explained in advance.
Momentum
Momentum is a term used in the area of mechanical physics. Imagine yourself sliding down
a slide in a water park. Typically, the slide speed will increase on the steeper sections and
therefore they will be passed faster. There are functions of high curvature that would highly
profit from a velocity increase and whose optimization would get stuck less likely in a local
minimum. Furthermore, a speed adjustment would be advantageous in case of similar gradients
with small values or if the gradients are noisy. The effect of momentum on gradient descent
optimization of a concave function is displayed in the figure below.
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Figure 9: Illustration of Momentum (from [(7), ch. 8, p. 293])
The altitude lines indicate the steepness. They are the closer the steeper the region between.
rather flat regions are passed faster with a larger step size and a smaller step size is used at the
steeper sections.
The velocity v is added to the iterative algorithm (usually SGD) as follows
v ←− αv − ∇θ
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
L(f(x(i); θ), y(i))
)
, (32)
θ ←− θ + v (33)
The hyperparameter α ∈ [0, 1) serves to control how fast the impact of earlier gradients on the
update decreases. With the ratio of α to  increasing, the more past gradients influence the
update of the direction. The more consecutive gradients point towards the same direction the
higher is the learning rate, as postulated above. The second parameter  is necessary to force
convergence.
There has also developed a different kind of momentum, the Nesterov momentum described
below.
Nesterov momentum
The development of Nesterov momentum succeeded Nesterov’s accelerated gradient method. It
differs from momentum in that the gradient is computed only after adding the current velocity
to the parameters. The corresponding update rules look as follows:
v ←− αv − ∇θ
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
L(f(x(i); θ + αv), y(i))
)
, (34)
θ ←− θ + v (35)
While Nesterov momentum effects batch GD in a positive way it does not seem to be advanta-
geous in SGD optimization.
ADAM owes its name to “adaptive moments” and shows similarities to a combination of mo-
mentum with an adaptive learning rate algorithm called RMSProp. It was introduced to
counteract the negative characteristics of a different adaptive learning rate algorithm called
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AdaGrad, namely decaying the learning rate too fast. RMSProp makes use of an additional
hyperparameter ρ to administer the extent of an exponentially decreasing moving average. Still
there are differences towards comprehending ADAM simply as the combination of RMSProp
with momentum. On the one hand, bias corrections are part of ADAM and on the other hand
momentum is involved in a different manner.
ADAM
Finally, the ADAM algorithm is presented below.
Algorithm (ADAM)
1: Require Step size  (Suggested: 0.001)
2: Require Exponential decay rates for moment estimates, ρ1 and ρ2 in [0, 1)
(Suggested: 0.9, 0.999)
3. Require Small constant δ used for numerical stabilization (Suggested: 10−8)
4. Require Initial parameters θ
5: Init 1st and 2nd moment variables: s = 0, r = 0
6: Init time step t = 0
7: while stopping criterion not met do
8: Sample a minibatch of m examples from the training set {x(1), ..., x(m)}
with corresponding targets y(i).
9: Compute gradient: g = 1m∇θ
∑
i
L(f(x(i); θ), y(i)
10: t = t+ 1
11: Update biased first moment estimate: s = ρ1s+ (1− ρ1)g
12: Update biased second moment estimate: r = ρ2r + (1− ρ2)g · g
13: Correct bias in first moment: sˆ = s1−ρt1
14: Correct bias in second moment: rˆ = r1−ρt2
15: Compute update: ∇θ = − sˆ√
rˆ+δ (element-wise)
16: Apply update: θ = θ +∇θ
17: end while
So far, there are no recommendations regarding the best learning algorithm. However, algo-
rithms with adaptive learning rates tend to produce rather robust results so far.
2.2.3 Error Backpropagation
This section is strongly oriented in [(7), ch.6] and [(8), ch.2].
The goal of optimization is to find the weights minimizing the error rate and hence the loss
function’s value. As stated earlier, neural networks correspond to a chain of functions and a
function’s gradient points towards the direction of the steepest descent and likely towards at
least a local minimum. In backpropagation both are combined. First, it is important to note
that the class of networks presented so far always works in that way that input is fed from one
side and then put through all layers until the output layer. Up to this section a network was
always supplied with input from one side and then the input was processed through all layers
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up to the output layer. This type of network is called Feed Forward Network and owes its
name precisely to this process. In the optimization process, however, it is advisable to first
consider the deviation from the target value, i.e. to start from the back. Backpropagation aims
to determine the deviation from the target value due to a parameter backwards through the
network and therefore backwards through a chained function. The XOR example is used again
for illustration purposes.
The optimal weight for the connection w(2)11 between z
(1)
1 and the output unit o shall be deter-
mined. The network also corresponds to the more compact notation
f(x) = fout(z(1)) = fout
fin ·
w(2)11
w
(2)
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+ w(2)0
 . (36)
Let the loss function be Mean Squared Error (MSE)
MSE(f) = 1|X|
∑
x∈X
|y − f(x)|2. (37)
The optimal w(2)11 minimizes the MSE for all x ∈ X . But not all nodes in the network depend
on w(2)11 . Neither nodes nor connections set before the hidden layer are influenced by the choice
of w(2) as it is applied only later. Consequently, the gradient of the MSE in regard of w(2)11 looks
as follows:
∂MSE(f)
∂w
(2)
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= ∂MSE(f)
∂fout
· ∂fout
∂fin
·
(
∂fin
∂w
(2)
11
+ ∂fin
∂w
(2)
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)
= ∂MSE(f)
∂fout
· ∂fout
∂fin
· ∂fin
∂w
(2)
11
(38)
The same procedure works for all weights to calculate their respective gradients - as long as
there exist derivatives for the used activation functions and loss. Before training, the weights
are initialized randomly. However, gradient-based optimization is useful only if it is stable.
Exploding and vanishing gradients both create new challenges as countermeasures are needed. In
a later section, vanishing gradients will be linked to so-called long-term-dependencies expressed
as rather deep functions consisting of a long chain of functions. A different model structure will
be proposed to counteract the cause. Now, a measure to react in case of exploding gradients is
described.
2.2.4 Gradient Clipping
The descriptions below are taken from [(7), ch.8].
Exploding gradients can occur due to the chain-wise application of functions. This gets obvious,
when thinking of multiplying a number a bit larger than 1 p-times. Let for instance p = 100,
then (1.1)100 = 13780.61 which is indeed large. A countermeasure is to clip the gradient with a
norm as follows
if ||g|| > t, then g ←− gt||g|| .
The effect of this measure is that the step size is bounded. Large step sizes carry the risk to
make the algorithm jump over the global minimum and this is where gradient clipping interferes.
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2.2.5 Regularization
Because of their often large capacity due to a large number of layers or parameter expensive
operations, neural networks are prone to overfitting, especially if the training data is of limited
size. A regularized loss function or the addition of noise as common in the area of machine
learning may provide a solution. However the network structure also includes the possibility of
a further measure.
Dropout
The following explanation is taken from [(26)].
If overfitting has occurred, the cause is in general two-fold. On the one hand, the model has
adapted to the training data too exactly and on the other hand, the type of adaptation was
already determined by the structure of the model. For this reason it would often be helpful to
have not only the prognosis of one model but the average prognosis of many models available.
Since it would be very costly to fit many models, the method of dropout was developed as a
less expensive alternative. Dropout requires the so-called dropout rate as a hyperparameter.
This rate is in the interval [0, 1] and indicates how many percent of the neurons in the network
are randomly neglected at each update. Ignoring some neurons results in a new network in each
iteration and therefore simulates the effect of averaging many models.
Figure 10: Visualizing the Effect of Dropout, Dropout Rate = 13 (Own Illustration)
2.3 Word Embeddings
If numerical operations shall be applied to text, representing the text in a numerical way is
consequently necessary. Popular techniques to do so and even find a continuous representation
are e.g. developed by Google (Word2Vec), Facebook (FastText) and Stanford (GloVe). Word
embeddings manage to reflect syntactic and semantic information together, more precisely, find
words with similar meanings or a close context theirselves in proximity. And there is an addi-
tional advantage coming along the continuous representations. In comparison to one-hot-coding
for instance whose dimensionality corresponds to the number of words inside the dictionary, a
lot less dimensions are needed. As the application part of this master thesis uses a Word2Vec
embedding, only Word2Vec is explained here.
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2.3.1 Word2Vec
The following descriptions are taken from [(12)] and [(15)].
The proposed Word2Vec architecture was the result of Tomas Mikolov and his team members’
assessment of several models regarding computational complexity and quality. It corresponds
to a group of two models both listed under the name Word2Vec.
The main focus lied upon training the representations in a way such that not only would semantic
closeness be reflected by spatial proximity but also should the vector space be based on “the
linear regularities between words” [(12), p.2]. A linear regularity of this kind is for instance
the formulation of a query as a vector operation and finding the corresponding result close to
the correct answer. More precisely should for example the sum of the vector representations of
“Russia” and “‘River” be close to the vector representation of “Volga River” [(12), p.2].
But before the quality can be optimized, training text must be fed into the model. Models
processing text data usually take text translated into tokens as input. This works similar for
all Natural Language Processing (NLP) tasks. The tokenization takes place by first identifying
unique words and counting their occurrences, then deciding on whether punctuation marks shall
be dismissed and allocating numbers to words afterwards, often in accordance to their count
(the higher the frequency, the lower the number). Taking for instance the following text fraction
“Eating porridge in the morning is a healthy way to start your day. Continuing with a short
workout will then keep the doctor away.”,
the text is first split into single words and all punctuation marks are removed. Then, replacing
all words with their corresponding token will result in something like
3|4|5|1|6|7|2|8|9|10|11|12|13|14|15|2|16|17|18|19|20|1|21|22.
Earlier approaches to finding continuous word vector representations consisted of a feed forward
network whose first layer would be a dense layer without activation function and therefore the
network would perform a simple linear projection. The consequent hidden layer would create a
non-linear feature map of the projected input. The disadvantage in training a so-called neural
network language model (NNLM) taking tokenized text as input and simultaneously learn-
ing the word vectors as well as a distribution of the words is its high computational expense.
Most of the computational effort is due to the non-linearity inside the hidden layer. This layer is
discarded in Word2Vec. Therefore, a language model is not built using an encompassing single
approach from the onset as a whole but a model with a modest number of parameters is used
first to train the word vectors and those are fed into the NNLM only thereafter. More precisely,
the process of training word vectors is now separated from learning the word distribution. Two
kinds of models are recommended in this respect and both are described below.
Continuous Bag-of-Words Model (CBOW)
The name of this model is influenced by one of the bag-of-words model’s characteristics, namely
the neglect of word order. Continuous vectors furthermore describe a word in its semantic
environment and consequently the representation is not simply bag-of-words. The weights of
the projection layer are shared for all tokens as there is no further hidden layer which results in
averaging the inputs. The prediction task is constructed as a log-linear classifier outputting the
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word inbetween a given input of several preceding and subsequent words. The network structure
for the prediction task is visualized in the figure below.
Figure 11: CBOW (Based on (15), p.3])
Continuous Skip-gram Model
The continuous Skip-gram Model owes its name to the N-Gram Model which includes the last
N − 1 preceding words to estimate the most likely successor [(31), p.4]. In contrast, Skip-Gram
omits some of those N − 1 words during training. Again, a model with one projection and no
further hidden layer is trained as a log-linear classifier but now it learns to predict a specific
number of context words for a given input word. The range size R indicates how many precedent
and subsequent words form the target set. The larger R the better word vectors are trained but
to the drawback of growing computational expenses. One way out comes with the observation
that words have usually less connection to words in a further distance. Consequently, sampling R
words inside a larger range C as well before as after the training word and allocating more weight
to the closer neighborhood does the trick. The Skip-gram Model is visualized as a feed-forward
network below.
Figure 12: Skip-Gram Architecture (Based on [(15)], p.3)
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In order to determine good word representations that facilitate the output of words in the context
of an input word, a suitable loss function is needed. The optimization of the following negative
log-likelihood
− 1
T
T∑
t=1
∑
−c≤ j≤ c, j 6=0
log p(wt+j |wt) (39)
leads to these representations where the high probability of finding a word in another word’s
context is reflected by their spatial proximity. The probability p(wt+j |wt) is calculated with the
softmax function which however is very costly. Therefore the Skip-Gram-Model as such does
not help to reduce computational expenses. In [(12)], three methods are presented with the aim
of reducing such expenses, the Hierarchical Softmax, Negative Sampling and Subsampling of
Frequent Words. As their explanation would go beyond the thematic objective of this master
thesis they are left out here.
2.3.2 (Paper) dpUGC: Learn Differentially Private Representation for User Gen-
erated Contents
Despite Word2Vec’s advantages in terms of efficiency, finding word embeddings for large data
sources still tends to be computationally very expensive. Being able to share a once developed
word embedding is yet of great interest. But one has to keep in mind that the embedding’s
ability to reflect contextual information can become problematic if the data source contains
sensitive information. For instance, in the case that Google requests are used as training data
the vector representations of user names might be found close to the name of their hometown
and consequently private information is exposed. Xuan-Son Vu, Son N. Tran and Lili Jiang
addressed the problem of finding a representation preventing re-identification while retaining as
much of the strength of interpretability as possible. Their approach [(13)] is now summarized
shortly to give an impression of how differential privacy may influence embedding training.
The proposed mechanism is applied to User Generated Content (UGC) data. The dataset used
contains a further incentive to research the topic of text anonymization as the access is restricted
since the beginning of 2018 and an anonymization approach may support a republication.
Differential private training is applied to a Word2Vec embedding trained with the aid of the
aforementioned Negative Sampling. However, the decision on when to apply differential privacy
should be well thought out. Introducing noise after the determination of the embedding involves
the risk of declining usability. Hence it is proposed to handle “the noise as a constraint” and
“insert noise during the learning process” to “optimize both the performance of the model and
its privacy” [(13), p.6]. Now, the idea is to introduce noise into the optimization by provoking a
slight shift of the gradient or subgradient used. This is the approach of DP-SGD (Differentially
Private Stochastic Gradient Descent). First, standard SGD is applied, then the 2-norm of the
gradient is clipped and noise is added thereafter. Incorporating this clipped gradient ∇˜(f(xi)),
the privacy mechanism is a modification of the Gaussian mechanism as
M(D) =
∑
i∈B
∇˜(f(xi)) +N (0, C2σ2I), (40)
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with C > 0 denoting the clipping constant. Now, iterations of DP-SGD are conducted to find
the optimal parameters. Within each iteration a so-called privacy accountant makes up the
sum of previously and present privacy budget used to check whether given privacy conditions
are still met.
The used mechanism was first proposed in [(10)]. The proof that DP-SGD does indeed fulfill the
requirements of differential privacy is not trivial and can be read in the corresponding paper.
While gradient clipping is actually a measure against exploding gradients, reading the paper
makes it clear that clipping the gradient norm in this case serves to prove differential privacy.
In both possible cases, when the privacy budget is summed up for all training epochs as well
as when the privacy budget is treated as a hyperparameter and set before training, there is a
trade-off between the number of training epochs and the size of the privacy budget as the budget
used grows with the number of iterations conducted. Consequently it would be useful to find
ways to exploit small privacy budgets and to replace the globally set budget with a personalized
one. Therefore, a personalized DP-Embedding with a suitable privacy accountant looking after
the respective privacy budgets is trained as well.
The results mostly meet the expectations. There are embeddings with an acceptable trade-off
between usability and privacy but the loss in utility reflects the early stopping of training due
to the privacy budget increase in each iteration. Furthermore, exploration at character level
provides the indication that differential privacy may sometimes work as regularization by noise
addition and even improve the training process.
At this point, a possible conclusion is that despite valuable results the training still suffered
from the trade-off between privacy and utility and hence it could be beneficial to try a different
strategy. As privacy and data utility correspond to two counterparts, a network that not only
builds on the contradiction but also exploits it to its advantage could be of use. The next section
deals with networks of this kind.
2.4 Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)
2.4.1 Introduction to GANs
The following section is based on [(36)] and [(19)].
In 1928, the scientist John von Neumann achieved a major breakthrough. He proved the so-
called minimax theorem of game theory. This theorem contains a game strategy for so-called
two-person zero-sum games, referring to games of two players where the winner takes the whole
stake while the opponent gets nothing. Furthermore in two-player zero-sum-games, a situation
that is advantageous for both players since any deviation means a worsening for both is called
Nash equilibrium. Interestingly, the minimax strategy where each player is maximizing their
profit under the constraint of simultaneously minimizing their risk turns out as Nash Equilib-
rium. While both terms are very common in the area of game theory, they might currently seem
misplaced in the area of deep learning. But this in fact changed in 2014, following the introduc-
tion of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs). In the following, their concept is described
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based on [(24)] and [(23)].
A common difficulty in dealing with the feed forward networks presented so far is the need for
labelled data. For each input there should be an associated target. However, in many situations
this is not possible either because of too large amounts of data or, for example, in the area of
anomaly detection, because there is no certainty at all as to when an anomaly is actually present.
For this reason, it is especially desirable to be able to model pdata using a network. In contrast
to classical classification or regression problems, the output of which is an approximation of the
label, a GAN outputs elements drawn from the approximated pdata. It is only able to do so
using a competitive training process including two models. The following is a description of how
this works.
A GAN is mainly constructed of a so-called generator network G and a discriminator network
D. These networks are challenging each other to achieve contradictionary goals simultaneously.
A typical example is to “think of one network as an art forger and the other as an expert” [(24),
p.1]. When it comes to visual data for example, G may try to generate images as similar to
the training data as possible, while D ‘receives both forgeries and real (authentic) images, and
aims to tell them apart” [(24), p.1]. The accuracy of D is trained with the help of an error
signal indicating whether an image was classified correctly or not. However G learns through
the competition only - it simply aims to create samples leading to a worse accuracy of D.
Mathematically, the generator can be seen as a mapping G : z 7→ Rdim(x) “from some represen-
tation space (latent space) to the space of the data” [(24), p.1] (dim(·) indicates the respective
dimensionality). For illustration purposes, assume that a data set of images showing planes is
to be used to generate further images with planes. A noise-generating distribution often oper-
ates as latent space. G will then try to transform the given noise in a way that the outcome
resembles an image of a plane. In contrast, D : x 7→ (0, 1) and thus determines a probability
that a given input x either belongs to the training data (value close to 1) or has been generated
by G. If the generator has learned the ability to create samples which are indistinguishable from
the training data, the discriminator will achieve the same results as in random guessing and
generically output a probability of 0.5. The structure is summarized in the figure below.
Figure 13: Basic Structure of a GAN (inspired by [(24), p.2]
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Both networks can be neural networks of any kind. Feed Forward Networks are common as well
as so-called Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) which are very popular when it comes to
visual data.
Training a GAN
To determine optimal parameters for both models the contradictory goals must be set into a
joint loss function. This is achieved by minimizing a loss function under the data distribution
induced by D and maximizing it under the data distribution induced by G:
max
G
min
D
V (G,D). (41)
More precisely, these contradictory objectives can be expressed as
V (G,D) = Ex∼ pdata(x) logD(x) + Ez∼ pz(z) log(1−D(G(z))). (42)
The minimization of this joint loss function then reflects both contradictory goals. On the
one hand, Ez∼pz(z) log(1 − D(G(z))) is minimized which corresponds to guiding the generator
model towards developing samples of such a good quality that D outputs a high probability for
them to belong to the real data. On the other hand Epdata(x) logD(x) is maximized so that the
discriminator is forced to identify samples of the real data distribution with high probability.
Goodfellow et al. have proven that
D∗(x) = pdata(x)
pdata(x) + pg(x)
(43)
is optimal for a given generator while every optimal generator model fulfills pg(x) = pdata(x).
When assuming the perfect generator, pg(x) can be replaced by pdata(x) in the above formula-
tion of D∗(x). The outcome indicates that the discriminator is no longer able to make better
predictions than p = 0.5 for all inputs and is consequently as confused as possible. This point of
the optimization process corresponds to the Nash Equilibrium when considering the adversarial
training as a two-player game between G and D.
The optimization is conducted separately or, more precisely the parameters of one model are
updated while the parameters of the other one are held fixed. It would be best to let the
discriminator after each iteration of the generator train until it has learned again to distinguish
perfectly between real and fake. However, it is common practice to adjust the discriminator
only a few iterations because otherwise the training would be too difficult for the generator.
The number k of D-iterations after one G-iteration is in fact a hyperparameter. In general, the
training of a GAN is known to be unstable and complex and it is often difficult to converge
to equilibrium. But as regards each problem setting there are usually specific measurements to
enable better training.
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2.4.2 (Paper) Learning Anonymized Representations with Adversarial Neural Net-
works
The inspiration to translate the contradiction of privacy and data utility into an adversarial loss
as proposed in the application part in a later chapter, comes, amongst others, from [(27)]. The
according paper is summarized shortly below.
The main idea of the paper is the construction of an adversarial network in order to encode
sensitive inputs. As in all previous settings, the encoding shall be performed in a way that
all relevant characteristics apart from the private ones are kept. The GAN will play the two
conflicting goals of privacy and data utility off against each other.
For a dataset X, a representation U , „regular labels“ Y and „private labels“ Z the provided
network structure looks as follows:
Figure 14: Construction of Adversarial Framework (own illustration)
The first classifier is used to assess the degree of privacy by measuring the amount of mutual
information between input and output while the second evaluates how well regular attributes are
preserved. QYˆ |U is therefore optimized with regard to the cross-entropy-loss. The adversarial
loss incorporates the losses of both prediction branches QZˆ|U and QYˆ |U . It aims to force the
encoder to focus on those attributes identifying a person as it decreases only if the remaining
data utility is high. Therefore, this approach is different from the previous ones in that it is
not differential privacy that is applied to the data and in that the remaining utility is therefore
evaluated only afterwards. Instead, the trade-off participates already actively in the training
process.
The Loss Function
The paper contains the complete derivation from an expression of the trade-off between the
two misclassification probabilities of the private and regular label classifier to a combined loss
function. Only the main characteristics are described here.
The trade-off between privacy and data utility may be reformulated as requiring the misclas-
sification probability of QYˆ |U to be low while the misclassification probability of QZˆ|U shall be
greater than at least 1 − . For instance,  = 0.5 corresponds to random guessing if there are
two persons to classify. Exploiting an upper respectively a lower bound for the misclassification
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probabilities, the loss function can be expressed as
min
(QU|X ,QYˆ |U )∈F
{
Remp(QYˆ |U , QU |X) + λ · I(PˆZ ; QˆU |Z)
}
, (44)
where I(PˆZ ; QˆU |Z) denotes the mutual information of the true private label distribution and
the distribution induced by QˆU |Z . Mutual information is a common term in information theory
and its mathematical definition simply expresses the obvious meaning. λ takes on the role of
a control parameter for the privacy-utility-trade-off. From the formula it gets obvious that the
larger λ the more privacy and the less mutual information is targeted for. The loss function
is still not tractable because of the mutual information relying on a joint probability. Further
amendments are made but all operations are of a mathematical nature and provide no further
understanding of how to include a privacy condition into the loss function. As a consequence,
further derivation is discarded here.
The authors propose to train the encoder as follows:
1. The encoder QU |X and the regular label branch QYˆ |U are optimized together with respect
to the regular label cross-entropy.
2. The private label predictor QZˆ|U is optimized according to its cross entropy loss, the
encoder is held fixed in the meanwhile.
3. The adversarial training alternates between
• sampling a batch of N training observations and update both branches and
• sampling a batch of N training observations and update the encoder.
In the alternation between updates of the opposing branches the adversarial training can be
read from the procedure.
The overall conclusion is that the data utility still suffers the more the level of privacy increases.
But in both example tasks, digit classification and sentiment analysis, an acceptable level of
usability is preserved. Finally, it is again important to emphasize that the proposed method is
different from differential privacy. Privacy is reduced with the mutual information depending on
the dataset and therefore without a generically applicable form. Furthermore, no randomness
was introduced.
2.4.3 (Paper) Generating Differentially Private Datasets using GANs
A second approach implementing the conflict of privacy and data utility into a GAN is described
now. All explanations follow the corresponding paper [(22)]. In contrast to the precedent paper,
a differential privacy mechanism as presented in the section about privacy is used, more precisely
the Gaussian noise mechanism
M(d) ∆= f(d) +N (0, s2f · σ2). (45)
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Again, the variance of the Gaussian distribution N (·, ·) is the product of a σ2 and the L2-
sensitivity of the function f .
The goal of this paper is the development of a mechanism to enable differentially private data
release, especially to third party machine learning providers. The users can apply the resulting
mechanism theirselves and therefore the need to trust a third party is redundant. So far, the
paper was declined as a conference paper at ICLR 2018 because several issues were detected.
Nonetheless, the main idea is described shortly. Below, the structure of the GAN is illustrated.
Figure 15: GAN of Proposed Structure [(22), p.4]
The dotted line in the discriminator shows the central idea of adding a Gaussian noise layer into
the discriminator part. This measure is based on the hope that the output of D and thus the
updates of G are differentially private then in comparison to the input data X. All corresponding
proofs are listed in the paper but as mentioned their validity seems to be questionable. Irre-
spective thereof, the results are interesting. First, a so-called teacher model was trained. This
teacher is the proposed GAN. Next, a student model is trained as a classifier on the generated
data. The student model is not restricted to any model class and provides a double advantage,
i.e. automated assessment of the output quality of G and the comparability of the test errors.
Two popular tasks were used to evaluate the remaining data utility, the MNIST dataset with
images of hand-written digits and the SVHN dataset containing photographs of house numbers
collected by Google Street View. The results seem indeed rather promising as an adequate level
of data utility is preserved at different privacy budgets.
The application section below is also based on an adversarial loss but due to the building blocks
(differential privacy and attention mechanisms) a GAN structure in the regular sense turned out
not viable. However, an adversarial loss will be used and the model presented below incorporates
a multi-objective-loss of this kind.
2.4.4 (Paper) Mobile Sensor Data Anonymization
Amongst others, artificial intelligence supports the fitness of people. Accelerometers and gyro-
scopes are examples of motion sensors helping to record motion patterns in order to quantify
sporting results. As those patterns are rather unique, re-identification of a user is feasible when
the sensor data is shared. In contrast, the utility to be kept corresponds to the recognition of spe-
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cific activities. In [(28)], a so-calledAnonymizing Auto-Encoder (AAE) is proposed in order
to amend the sensor data accordingly. To understand the term auto-encoder, encoder-decoder
networks are briefly introduced first, in accordance with [(11), p.3-4]. Then, autoencoders and
the proposed AAE are represented according to [(28)].
When thinking of a translation task, a network will need to first find a representation of the
provided input, for instance a sentence in English. A new representation is determined either
to reduce the input’s dimensionality by first identifying and then concentrating on the most
important features only or to extend its informational content by practically unfolding the initial
form into a higher-dimensional space. This is called encoding and all layers performing encoding
represent the encoder part of the network. The output sentence however, is French. The
encoding is then again transformed but now in a way that it represents the French translation.
This procedure is called decoding.
An auto-encoder is characterized in that encoding and decoding are fitted for the same in and
output. The AAE shall be placed at the user’s device to encode sensitive data before sharing as
presented in the image below.
Figure 16: Anonymization before Data Sharing [(28)]
The anonymization technique is not based on differential privacy as every DP-mechanism is
based on an overall data set and this would involve prior data sharing. In contrast, as in the
earlier explained paper, an information-theoretic approach is chosen and the mutual information
between the anonymized data and the true user names is minimized.
The Loss Function
The multi-loss function reflecting the desire for anonymization together with the preservation
of the sport specific patterns under the additional condition of only minimal overall change of
the data, has the following form:
L = βiLi + βaLa + βdLd. (46)
All hyperparameters β target the trade-off between the three kinds of losses. The loss of user-
specific information Li is measured with respect to the mutual information as explained before.
La corresponds to the categorical cross-entropy-loss in the activity classification model. Finally,
Ld measures the discrepancy between input data X and anonymized output X ′ as a distance.
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2.5 Recurrent Network Architectures
2.5.1 Introduction to Recurrent Networks
So far in this master thesis, networks have only processed an input tensor of fixed size. But when
it comes to unstructured data types as text documents it is advantageous to use a more flexible
architecture that additionally pays respect to the input order. A respective network structure
is presented based on [(7), ch.10] and [(39)]. Recurrent neural networks (RNNs) take an input
sequence of variable-length and output a fixed-size encoding of the input. They accomplish so
by reading in parts of the input sequence one at a time, each of equal size and each at a time
step t. For example, a book was read in word by word which also corresponds to how a person
would read. Continuing the example of reading a book word after word, at each time step, sort
of a summary of all precedent words (the context) is combined with the current word and a
joint representation is produced. Thanks to the sequential reading process, the order of the
words implicitly influences this summary. At any time step, the summary representation is of
fixed-length. The model owes its ability to read sequences of variable length to the fact that
the same parameters θ are used for each new representation of a previous context and a current
word. The parameters are said to be shared among all hidden layers and for each word the
hidden layer is simply reproduced. The procedure is recursive as each computation involves
the computation in the previous time step. The figure below aims to illustrate the network
architecture.
Figure 17: The RNN Architecture, inspired by [(7), p.373]
While the value of hidden unit at timestep t is computed as
h(t) = f(h(t−1), x(t); θ) (47)
actually all previous computations back to the first one (h(0)) are implicitly contained inside the
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equation:
h(t) = f(h(t−1), x(t); θ) =
= f(f(h(t−2), x(t−1); θ), x(t); θ) =
= f(f(f(h(t−3), x(t−2); θ), x(t−1); θ), x(t); θ) =
= (...)
(48)
From this formula it gets obvious that this is only possible thanks to the shared weights θ.
The optimal shared weights are again approximated with backpropagation. In order to pay
respect to the recursive nature of the chain function it is called Backpropagation through
time (BPTT). Unfortunately, regarding the optimization an obstacle becomes obvious from
the shown recursivity. On the one hand, the longer a sequence the larger is the computational
effort as the model is trying to memorize all precedent history. This results in long-term
dependencies whose practical relevance is sometimes questionable. On the other hand com-
plications as vanishing or exploding gradients are likely to arise. One solution for exploding
gradients is the previously explained measure of gradient clipping. A version of the basic recur-
rent network which was deepened in order to counteract the causes of the gradient behaviour is
called Long-Short-Term Memory (LSTM) and is presented further below.
2.5.2 Bidirectionality
Up to this section, there were only forward connections in a recurrent network described. In a
task where the RNN reads in text, the context representation is consequently performed with
regard to all words before the current input word only. This ignores however the fact that a
word within a sentence is usually not only in context to the preceding words but to all words
in the sentence respectively to words in preceding and subsequent sentences also. Bidirectional
RNNs aim to solve this issue by including an additional hidden layer in order to read in the
input in reverse order also. The consequent network structure is displayed in the figure below.
Figure 18: A Bidirectional RNN, inspired by [(7), p.389]
There are now two seperate hidden layers at each time step whose outputs are both input to
the next layer (in the above figure the next layer corresponds to the output layer).
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2.5.3 Long-Short-Term Memory (LSTM)
As mentioned before, recurrent networks are likely to suffer from vanishing or exploding gradi-
ents. The reason for the impractical gradient behaviour lies mainly in long-term dependencies
arising when reading in long sequences. When recalling the example of reading a book, it is safe
to say that in order to understand a sentence, not all words are equally important. For example,
if you want to use a recipe to decide whether a dish is sweet or salty, you will actually need a
fraction of the text only. Ingredients affect the taste but all other words have no influence on the
result. It would therefore be of use to be able to forget some of the text. Long-Short-Term
Memory (LSTM) Networks are examples of gated RNNs that incorporate a mechanism to
discard information. There is a reduced variant of the LSTM also, called Gated Recurrent
Unit (GRU) but only the LSTM is described here. In addition to the sources listed above, the
section is in addition based on [(38)].
In LSTMs, the main idea is to optimize a network with respect to the best paths through time
and therefore the best rule for forgetting. Mechanisms of such kind are implemented as self-loops
inside the hidden layer at each time step. The self-loop has no fixed form but depends on the
context. The mechanism is illustrated in the figure below.
Figure 19: Exemplary LSTM Architecture, inspired by [(38)]
As displayed in the figure, the LSTM differs from an ordinary RNN in that an inner recurrence
happens inside each LSTM cell in addition to the outer recurrence. Hence, more parameters
are added to those of the ordinary RNN. Inside the LSTM cell, there are several gates with
different tasks. First, the forget gate f (t)i takes weighted projections of the current input xt
and the precedent hidden state h(t−1) and applies a sigmoid σ to their sum:
f
(t)
i = σ
bfi +∑
j
Ufi,jx
(t)
j +
∑
j
W fi,jh
(t−1)
j
 . (49)
bf , Uf and W f refer to the forget gate specific bias, input weight and recurrent weight matrices.
Next, the external input gate unit g(t)i is computed as
g
(t)
i = σ
bgi +∑
j
Ugi,jx
(t)
j +
∑
j
W gi,jh
(t−1)
j
 . (50)
The computation is highly similar to the forget gate computation but differs in the gate specific
bias and weights bg, Ug and W g. Now, the internal state s(t)i is updated involving f
(t)
i and
36
g
(t)
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i = f
(t)
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(t−1)
i + g
(t)
i σ
bi +∑
j
Ui,jx
(t)
j +
∑
j
Wi,jh
(t−1)
j
 (51)
Last, the LSTM output is controlled involving the output gate q(t)i . The value of the output
gate unit is computed as
q
(t)
i = σ
boi +∑
j
Uoi,jx
(t)
j +
∑
j
W oi,jh
(
jt− 1)
 (52)
and plays then a role in the following calculation of the hidden unit h(t)i :
h
(t)
i = tanh
(
s
(t)
i
)
q
(t)
i . (53)
An alternative method saving computational efforts when it comes to long-term dependencies
in comparison to the LSTM is described within the next section.
2.6 The Concept of Attention
2.6.1 Attention in Recurrent Networks
The following section is strongly oriented in [(5)], [(11)], [(14)], [(29)] and [(35)].
Recalling how recurrent networks handle sequential data, namely by sequentially constructing
a representation including the information of precedent inputs, information is sometimes kept
over long connections. With the length of such connections the number of parameters needed
increases accordingly and so does the length of chained functions. This results in small weights
leading to gradients with small entries when it comes to optimizing those weights. The smaller
the gradients, the smaller improvement is influenced by one gradient descent iteration and hence
the algorithm may get stuck. This complication is called the Vanishing Gradient Problem.
While LSTMs and GRUs try to tackle the challenges coming along with long-range dependencies,
they still lose some efficiency as their models have to be able to reflect the longest dependencies
and are too complex for shorter inputs as a consequence. Additionally, further computational
expenses are required to calculate these partly unnecessary weights. In order to address the
problem of vanishing gradients, inflexible representations and to partially avoid computational
efforts, attention mechanisms were introduced by Bahdanau et al. in 2015 and published as part
of [(29)].
Image Captioning represents a task that highly profits from attention mechanisms. When looking
at a picture and trying to describe it, a human would not pay attention to all parts of the image
at once. They would rather focus on different parts after each other and as they most likely
have already explained images before, they would be following a certain recipe. Such a recipe
could be to concentrate on the surrounding first, and then describe the events within. Attention
tries to imitate this process by involving specific linear projections in different layers, expressing
which parts of the input are especially important during a specific phase.
Fig. 20 shows exemplarily which parts of a picture an attention network attends to in order to
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formulate a content description. The network will learn English syntax over time and as it must
produce a sequential output it will also learn to first attend to those parts of the image referring
to the first word of a sentence the most likely. The linguistic rules of the target output thus
influence the order in which sections of the picture are viewed and this surely holds efficiency.
Figure 20: Image Captioning with Attention-Based Networks [(35)]
As attention mechanisms got famous in translation tasks, they were implemented into recurrent
networks first. The mechanism is displayed in the figure below.
Figure 21: Attention Mechanism in a Recurrent Network [(29)]
Inside the recurrent network, attention is calculated as a weighted sum over hidden units. More
precisely, a new context representation c(i) in order to especially support the generation of output
o(i) is at time step i calculated as
c(i) =
τ∑
t=1
αith
(t). (54)
Each weight αit indicates the importance of hidden state ht at output time step i. To calculate
the respective weight, a so-called alignment model is needed first. The alignment model
determines scores describing the link between a hidden unit h(t) and an output unit o(i) as
follows:
eit = a(o(i−1), h(t)). (55)
38
The alignment model corresponds to the later introduced compatibility function. Each re-
spective weight is then computed with a softmax function:
αit =
exp (eit)
τ∑
k=1
exp (eik)
. (56)
Due to the softmax operation all entries of the attention matrix are greater than zero and sum
up to 1. In addition, the weighted sum is easily differentiable.
There is furthermore the distinction between local and global attention, depending on whether
all hidden states or only a local subset are regarded in the softmax. The difference becomes
clear when the example of reading a book is taken up again. In order to understand the current
sentence, it is usually sufficient to be aware of the context of the corresponding page and thus
to grasp a local context. However, if the book is to be summarized, the whole content of the
book is important and a global context representation must be created.
Figure 22: Global and Local Attention [(14)]
The terms soft and hard attention also refer to either weighting all hidden units and therefor
only emphasizing some of them more than others (soft) or discarding all hidden units apart from
a subset when determining the representation (hard).
However, in addition to the desire to avoid the computational expenses still coming along with
all kinds of recurrent networks, there may be situations in which non-recurrent networks are
simply better suited like convolutional neural networks in image processing. The solution to
the problem of including attention in non-recurrent networks is called self-attention and was
introduced by Google as part of the Transformer model in 2017.
2.6.2 The Transformer
All following explanations are based on the corresponding paper [(3)] unless indicated differently.
The Transformer is described as most likely “the first transduction model relying entirely on
self-attention to compute representations of its input and output without using sequence-aligned
RNNs or convolution” [(3), p.2].
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As remarked above, it is in general tasks involving a sort of alignment, more precisely tasks
which rely on structural dependencies between input and output, that profit from an efficient
way to draw the respective connections. Transformers were therefor first developed to improve
translation tasks and reached significant better scores than all previous models on the WMT 2014
English-to-German and WMT 2014 English-to-French translation tasks. Additionally, the model
structure offers new ways of parallelization and thus a considerable amount of computational
effort can be saved. As in many translation tasks, the Transformer’s structure corresponds to a
encoder-decoder-model. The Transformer consists of a sequence of blocks of layers for both
the decoder and the encoder part. The model works in a auto-regressive way as in each step
the current input and the newly created representation are added together. The exact model
structure is not of specific interest to this master thesis but for the sake of completeness shown
in a figure below.
Figure 23: Transformer Model Architecture [(3)]
The original Transformer consists of N = 6 encoder and decoder blocks. After adding the input
and output word embeddings to the model, there is an additional operation called positional
encoding. In a recurrent network, the word order in a sentence is submitted automatically
thanks to the sequential data processing. But when reading in more than one word at a time as
it is the case in a non-recurrent network like the Transformer, information about their order must
be stored differently. The authors propose to use trigonometric functions of different frequencies
for the purpose:
PE(pos,2i) = sin(pos/100002i/dmodel)
PE(pos,2i+1) = cos(pos/100002i/dmodel)
(57)
While dmodel refers to the depth of the word embedding, i describes the dimension and pos
the word’s position within the input text. The resulting encoding can simply be added to the
embedding as both are dmodel-dimensional.
All prerequisites for the model are explained now and finally the integrated attention mechanism
can be described.
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Scaled Dot-Product Attention
Recalling the application of attention in a recurrent network, namely sequentially applying
softmax to the output of the precedent hidden layer, such procedure must now be transferred
to a non-recurrent model. The main purpose of attention is to draw connections - these may for
instance link input and output or the input with itself. In order to find more general terms, the
authors define attention functions „as mapping a query and a set of key-value pairs to an output“
(p.3). However, there are many tasks where it does not make sense to speak of key-value pairs
as neither keys and values are the same nor is the query formulation strict. In self-attention it
is particularly redundant, as all of them are the same and a current representation is attending
to its own parts. Nevertheless, the following definition uses the query-key-value notation with
Q indicating a matrix containing a batch of query vectors as columns, K the corresponding
matrix of key vectors and V the corresponding matrix of value vectors. With dq, dk and dv,
the respective amount of vectors is denoted. Next, it is necessary to decide on a compatibility
function to describe the relations among Q, K and V . With the dot-product as compatibility
function, attention is computed as follows:
Attention(Q,K, V ) = softmax
(
QKT√
dk
)
· V (58)
Scaling with 1√
dk
helps to prevent softmax(QKT ) to take large values causing small respec-
tive gradients and consequently aggravating the optimization process. Below, there is a figure
showing Dot-Product-Attention in the style of a graphical model for better illustration purposes.
Figure 24: Dot-Product-Attention (based on [(3)])
Additive attention could replace the dot-product attention but is computationally more ex-
pensive and slower. In additive attention, the compatibility function is replaced with a sum.
However, for large dimensional key vectors it works better than dot-product attention without
scaling. It can be implemented as a feed forward network with one hidden layer linking the
queries and key-value pairs to an output.
Multi-Head Attention
Applying the above attention function neglects available information about the keys, values and
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queries as only the model’s dimension is used. In order to remedy this suboptimal situation,
the authors recommend linear projections of the keys, queries and values. More precisely, as
described above a scaled-dot-product-attention is applied but num heads times instead of one. In
the tensorflow implementation of the transformer model [(37)], the embedding depth is splitted
num heads times and scaled-dot-product-attention is then applied to the dimensionally reduced
queries, keys and vectors. Each such attention output is then called an attention head. In a
last step, they are again concatenated and the input dimension is restored. After concatenation
of all attention heads and a further projection, one arrives at the final output:
MultiHead(Q,K, V ) = Concat(head1, ...,headh)WO
with headi = Attention(QWQi ,KWKi , V W Vi )
The projections are conducted by multiplication of Q, K and V with respective parameter
matrices WQi ∈ Rdmodel×dq , WKi ∈ Rdmodel×dk and W Vi ∈ Rdmodel×dv and finally the concatenated
attention heads are multiplied with WO ∈ Rnum heads·dh×dmodel , where dh corresponds to the
(reduced) dimension used (dh = dv/h) to create the attention heads.
Figure 25: Multi-Head-Attention (based on [(3)])
Comparison of Computational Efforts with and w/o Self-Attention
The table presented is oriented in [(3), p.6].
Layer Type Complexity per Layer Seq. Operations Max. Path Length
Self-Attention O(n2 · d) O(1) O(1)
Recurrent O(n · d2) O(n) O(n)
Convolutional O(k · n · d2) O(1) O(logk(n))
According to [(37)], splitting the embedding dimension into different heads certainly holds the
additional advantage of reduced computational effort.
2.6.3 BERT
End of october 2018, Google launched a pretrained open-source model in order to facilitate
NLP tasks. Their follwing description is based on [(33)]. The model is called Bidirectional
Encoder Representations from Transformers (BERT) and aims to tackle the common
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problem of too low amounts of training data. Instead, BERT is pretrained on a corpus con-
taining all Wikipedia text in sort of a revolutionary way. While common word embeddings
transfer contextual similarities into space, BERT further extends the inclusion of context into
the representation and is called „the first deeply bidirectional, unsupervised language represen-
tation“ model. The bidirectionality refers to including precedent and subsequent words into
the representation building. Everybody can then use the pretrained BERT and conduct fine-
tuning with their own task-specific smaller data sets. The combination with the pretrained
model has proven to outperform training from scratch, i.e. in tasks like sentiment analysis and
question-answering.
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3 Development of an Attention-Based Anonymization Algorithm
Several approaches to anonymization were presented in the previous chapter. The idea to transfer
the contrary goals of reaching high level of both, data utility and privacy, into an adversarial
loss is central to the approach described now. Two amendments were made in comparison to
the previous attempts. On the one hand, a self-attention mechanism is added in order to attend
to the parts of the text containing the most sensitive data. On the other hand, the privacy
descriptions as well as the algorithm applying dX -privacy to bags of words in accordance with
[(21)] are utilized with the equal sized bags-of-words exchanged for documents of a standard
length and additional multiplication with an attention matrix. As far as informed, this is the first
approach to combine attention and differential privacy. The resulting anonymization technique
is applied on the famous Enron email dataset. In the following, the data set is explained first,
secondly the word embedding, then the theory that makes up the anonymization strategy and
finally the models used. All networks are constructed using the deep learning library keras
(version 2.2.4) with a tensorflow backend (version 2.0). The following notation will accompany
the explanations:
Notation Meaning
max email len standard email length
hidden size size of the embedding vectors
dp eps privacy respective 
num heads number of attention heads
padding value value used to fill emails up to standard length
num classes number of sendersheight
Table 1: Notation in the Application Part
3.1 Enron Email Dataset
3.1.1 The History of Enron Corporation
The famous story behind the publication of the Enron Email Corpus is described according to
[(17)] and [(18)].
After the merger of two smaller energy companies in Texas, Enron Corporation was founded in
1985. From 1996 to 2001, Enron was recognized annually by Fortune Magazine as “America’s
most innovative company”. The reason for this was that the company had begun to focus not
only on energy but also on a well-positioned fund. Unfortunately, the fund was not as profitable
as shown and over time it became apparent that billions of dollars of debt had been disguised
using a broad band of accounting tricks. Enron was officially declared bankrupt on December
2nd in 2001. The particularly deep fall from the acclaimed business strategy to the company’s
dissolution, made the company all the more famous. Following the declared bankruptcy, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission conducted numerous investigations. In the course of
these investigations, over 500,000 emails, mostly sent by senior management, were published.
In 2015, a new version of the dataset was released to counteract the public speculation about
blame. However, the relationship between sender and text has been preserved which will be
used to explore anonymization in the present master thesis.
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The version of the email corpus provided on kaggle as .csv file was processed. It is based on the
version previously published in [(18)].
3.1.2 Amendments to the Corpus
First, the corpus had to be cleansed in order to generate some standardized format. R Studio
was used to perform those adaptations. Several string split operations were conducted to receive
a large table containing a sender name of the form “allen-p” in the first and the corresponding
message text in a second column. Since some emails were forwarded, the message text was
sometimes containing a sequence of emails and addresses. After several unsuccessful approaches
to preserve only the first email in the sequence (if the first one was actually written by the
sender), all forwarded emails were discarded. Next, several word and symbol filters were applied
to erase obvious spam mails. Finally, all empty emails as well as all emails from senders outside
of Enron were filtered out.
After the standardized format was obtained, it was observed that many of the remaining emails
were impractically long with a length up to 11,000 words. Following a recommendation of pro-
fessor Heumann, the emails were not simply shortened to a standard length, but split several
times. This procedure had two weaknesses, however. Firstly, the possibility of strong correla-
tions between the split emails arose and secondly, the original relationships between a sender
and the number of emails they sent would be greatly distorted. In order to encounter these
complications, all e-mails were split in a way such that only the first and the last part remained.
This has the advantage that the salutation and the farewell formula, which probably support
the sender identification the most, are preserved. It was experimented with the lengths 200 and
100 words. After application of further filters, 312789 emails of max email len=200 respectively
370841 emails in case of max email len=100, were available for further usage. To enable sender
identification even further, one of 12 different farewell phrases containing the sender name were
appended to all emails using a random mechanism. In order to not reduce the identification
mechanism to only read the last word, the name is put at a different position in some phrases
in a semantical consistent way. As shorter emails are later padded to a common length, the
identification is even more difficult than simply looking onto the last words. Finally, identifi-
cation should not be made simpler by biasing the dataset towards senders with many emails.
Consequently, among all employees with at least 1000 emails, 1000 emails were chosen randomly.
The final corpus now contains 80, 000 emails of 80 different employees for a sequence length of
200 and 90, 000 of 90 different employees for a sequence length of 100.
Further data preprocessing was then conducted in Python 3.7.4. All emails were tokenized into
words and punctuation marks as well as stopwords removed. Finally, the maximal email lengths
were set to 70 and 135, each with a share of 3.3% truncated emails (supposedly without farewell
phrase).
3.2 Word Embedding Corpus
Since the anonymization approach will try to remove sender names and characteristic text fea-
tures, it strongly depends on a word embedding which is trained on all these. It seemed that the
pretrained Word2Vec is able to adapt its weights when further trained but will not include new
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words. Consequently, there was the need to train an own embedding. The used word embedding
is trained on the email corpus itself and several text datasets from kaggle, using Python’s gensim
package. In addition to the Enron Email corpus, several data sets from kaggle were used to
enrich the corpus to train the embedding on:
• 306, 242 US Financial News Articles
• ≈ 35, 000 Wikipedia Movie Plots
• > 180, 000 Australian Election Tweets from 2019 and
• A Million News Headlines
Afterwards, embeddings of different dimensions (50, 60, 80 and 100) were trained.
3.3 Bidirectional LSTM Network for Sender Identification
In order to evaluate the anonymization progress with a base model, a good network for sender
identification had to be determined. Since the Enron Email Dataset enjoys great popularity
due to its rare size, there have already been various attempts to automatically identify the
senders. The bidirectional Long-Short-Term-Memory Network used is taken from [(16)], a github
repository of several attempts to identify the senders of Enron emails. The result has the
following structure:
Figure 26: Bidirectional LSTM for Sender Identification
3.4 Sender Identification with Attention
The main idea of the anonymization mechanism presented here, is to add noise to word vectors
of those words which are identified to support the sender identification. The idea is further that
a network containing an attention mechanism and optimizing a loss function in order to identify
senders, will adapt the attention weights towards the respective important parts of the text. A
feedforward network with a similar structure as the LSTM is used. An additional dense layer
with only two units is introduced to reduce the dimensionality before flattening. The reason for
46
this is that there are now 2· hidden length ·90 (resp. 80) instead of 20· hidden length ·90 (resp.
80) connections which decreases the computational effort significantly and does in addition not
exhaust the information content of the training data in terms of too numerous parameters. The
network structure looks as follows:
Figure 27: The Identificator Network
The attention mechanism is implemented as a layer in accordance with a former tensorflow
implementation of the Transformer model in Github [(37)]. In order to retain position-related
information, positional encoding is added element-wisely to the embedded vectors before they
are fed to the network. This is the first difference to the original implementation, because
there the embedding was trained as part of the model and therefore the positional encoding
is added inside the model. In this thesis, the model was completely implemented in keras
which unfortunately resulted in a loss of flexibility and further differences in comparison to
the original implementation. Instead of Dense Layers to perform the linear projections of the
queries, keys and values inside the SelfAttention layer, a multiplication with trainable weight
matrices is implemented. This amendment was necessary as keras does not seem to support the
implementation of layers inside other layers. If the attention weights were adapted to padded
values also, they would lose some of their potential. Therefore, a mechanism inside [(37)] sets
these weights to zero. This idea is here packed into a Padding Bias Layer. It takes the
current input batch and marks padded words with −∞. Inside the attention mechanism in the
subsequent SelfAttention layer, a softmax operation is applied on the sum of the weighted input
and the padding bias. The corresponding sum is again a matrix with all values corresponding
to padded words set to −∞. The softmax operation to calculate the corresponding attention
weights allocates the weight 0 to padded words as exp (x) x→−∞−→ 0. The dropout mechanism
proposed in the original Transformer here happens only after the SelfAttention layer as again
keras did not allow to use a layer inside a layer. Abbreviations from the results presented in
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[(3)] are expected in consequence.
To assess the improvement coming along with self-attention in comparison to a simple feed
forward network, the network of the Identificator without Padding Bias and SelfAttention layer
is evaluated also. The corresponding network will be called Basic Feedforward Network (Basic
FFN). Its structure is displayed below.
Figure 28: The Basic FFN - Without Attention Mechanism
3.5 Combine Attention and a Privacy Mechanism
The privacy mechanism proposed in [(21)] makes use of a multivariate Laplacian because of its
appealing form (most of the noise lies within a small surrounding). In the corresponding paper,
it was firstly important to show that it is possible to transfer dX -privacy from vectors to matrices
(from a row of data to a bag of words each represented as a word vector). The mechanism adds
a multivariate Laplace noise vector to each word vector independently. Unfortunately, there was
so far no implementation of the multivariate Laplacian and consequently the authors had to
derive a solution to this problem first. However in this thesis, because the independence of all
noise should not influence the model outcome in a negative way, no multivariate Laplacian but a
matrix of Laplace random numbers is used. A dX -private algorithm making use of this Laplace
Matrix is proposed. Instead of word-wise addition, the noise is added to each entry of the
document matrix in an independent manner. The replacement of a multivariate Laplacian with
i.i.d. random Laplace numbers also simplified the proof of privacy for the proposed mechanism.
Still, the mechanism had to be extended from one entry to the whole document matrix.
The below mechanism together with the information regarding the Manhattan Metric is based
on [(21)] but was adapted in order to involve the multiplication with the attention matrix.
Because the attention matrix has the same size as the document, the mechanism is formulated
in terms of one document instead of one (word)vector.
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Theorem 3. (Laplace mechanism for documents with Attention)
Given  > 0 and n, m ∈ Z+, letMAtt : Rn → DRn×m be a mechanism that, given a matrix
X ∈ Rn×m and a matrix A ∈ Rn×m+ outputs a noisy value as
X 7→ X +A ·X ′,
where X ′ ∈ Rn×m consists of i.i.d. random numbers distributed as Lap(1 ). The product of X ′
and A is conducted element-wise. ThenMAtt satisfies min
i,j
|aij | || · ||-privacy where || · || denotes
the so-called Manhattan Metric computed as the sum of the element-wisely computed L1-norm
on Rn.
Proof. The according proof is part of the appendix.
As in this master thesis the entries of A do not correspond to hyperparameters,  remains the
only hyperparameter in charge of the privacy-utility-trade-off.
The following algorithm represents an adaptation of the in [(21)] proposed algorithm to apply
the concept of Earth-Mover’s-Privacy to bags-of-words. It is adapted in several ways. On the one
hand, emails are not represented as bag-of-words and the term “bag” is replaced with “email”
in consequence. On the other hand, the noise is computed as a matrix in a compact form and
then multiplied with attention values.
Algorithm Earth Mover’s Privacy Mechanism with Attention
Require: document X, hidden size m, max email len n, epsilon 
1: procedure GenerateNoisyMatrix(X,n,m, )
2: Sample Z ∈ Rn·m i.i.d∼ Lap(1 ) n ·m
3: Reshape Z as (n,m)
4: return Z
5: end procedure
Require: mail X, attention matrix A, hidden size n, epsilon 
1: procedure GeneratePrivateMail(X,A, n,m, )
2: Z←−GenerateNoisyMatrix(X,n,m,)
3: P←− X +A · Z
4: return P
5: end procedure
Subsequently to training the attention weights with respect to author identification, those
weights are extracted in form of a max email len × hidden size matrix WAtt. When extracted,
WAtt has values in a different range than [0, 1], as no softmax was applied after the last linear
projection. However, in order to achieve the desired effect, all matrix entries must be scaled to
this interval and therefore a softmax is applied:
A = softmax(WAtt) (59)
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In the following, this matrix A is referred to as attention matrix. Next, A is multiplied element-
wisely with an equally sized matrix of Laplace noise, generated as described above. Higher
weights should then result in higher noise values as

aij
aij→1−−−−→  (60)
which fits the purpose, as to more significant words more noise should be added to. In contrast,

aij
aij→0−−−−→∞, (61)
accounts to less important words and at this scale nearly no noise is produced under a Laplace
distribution. In a final step, the weighted noise matrix is added to the input text.
In none of these definitions the Earth Mover’s Metric was used. The next section about the
measurement of the remaining data utility provides a more extensive derivation of reasons, at
this point it is sufficient to know that the Earth Mover’s Metric for documents of equal length
differs from the specific form of Manhattan Metric used only by the constant factor 1max email len
which is irrelevant for optimization. The above theorem therefore also implies Earth Mover’s
Privacy.
From the explanations before, the larger  the less privacy is created but the more data utility
preserved. However, thanks to the multiplication with the inverse of the scaled attention values
the more sensitive the data point xij , the larger is the corresponding value aij and the more
privacy is produced and vice versa. The definition profits furthermore from the softmax, as A
does not have zero-valued entries and there is no unfavourable division with 0 in aij . However,
the effect of A on  is two-fold, as on the one hand the privacy guarantee depends on the ability
ofWatt to capture all sensitive data and on the other hand, the privacy guarantee is only a lower
bound to a locally varying bound.
3.6 Measure of Remaining Data Quality
On Github, several unsupervised tasks like sentiment analysis and spam detection were executed
on the Enron Email Data. Both options to determine the data utlity were excluded here for two
reasons. On the one hand, spam emails were deleted during the data cleansing process in order
to train attention as accurately as possible, and on the other hand the email quality was not
sufficient to perform a task with a good accuracy from the start. In [(21)] not only the level or
privacy but also the data utility was evaluated with a measure of topic relatedness - the Earth
Mover’s Distance. The idea is that the distance d “is a measure of utility” [(21), p.14] itself,
as further tasks will need the output text to be close in topic to the input text. Consequently,
it seems reasonable to adopt this idea and select the utility loss Lutility as the Earth Mover’s
Distance between input and its anonymized equivalent.
The corresponding loss makes then use of either the euclidean or the L1-norm to evaluate the
distance between words at the same positions in two documents. All other words are neglected
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as gets obvious from the equations below. The Earth Mover’s Metric corresponds to
EdS (X,Y ) :=
∑
xi ∈X
∑
yj ∈Y
dS(xi, yj)Fij (62)
where the flow matrix is of the form
Fij =
1 for i = j0 for i 6= j. (63)
if both emails are of the same size. Consequently, the definition reduces to
EdS (X,Y ) :=
max email len∑
i=1
dS(xi, yi)Fii =
1
max email len
max email len∑
i=1
dS(xi, yi). (64)
In terms of optimization the factor 1max email len may be neglected as constant factors do not
influence the optimization process. If the factor is not neglected the term above simply corre-
sponds to the mean distance of words between an original email and its replacement. The EMD
loss was implemented in keras as the custom loss emd loss.
3.7 Combine Privacy and Utility Trade-Off in an Adversarial Loss
In order to involve the privacy-utility trade-off in the training process, it seemed a valuable
attempt to combine the contradictory goals inside an adversarial loss. While the anonymization
mechanism, a measure of utility and a model to train the attention values with respect to sender
identification are already described, a strategy to combine all into one model is missing at this
point. The figure below illustrates at which pointWatt is extracted. It is contained in the output
attention_output = inputs+Watt (65)
of the SelfAttention layer inside the Identificator network. The attention output is then fed to
the Noiser model. In the custom layer AttnTens, the input is simply subtracted in order to
obtain Watt. The anonymization mechanism is then applied inside the custom LaplaceNoise
layer with respect to privacy hyperparameter . In order to support the attention matrix inside
the Identificator in a way such that it focuses on the sensitive data only, the topic-relatedness
of input email and anonymized email should be maximized and the Earth Mover’s Distance
between these emails minimized as a consequence. The above described emd loss induced by
the euclidean norm || · ||2 is used as Lutility. The EMD loss induced by the L1-norm || · ||1 is
discarded as in gradient-based optimization the model does not learn with respect to a non-
concave function. The model implementation is strongly oriented in [(25)].
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Figure 29: Adversarial Loss: Privacy vs. Utility
The training procedure reveals that the Anonymizer incorporates an adversarial loss but not
the one distinct to GANs. Instead, Watt is updated twice - by alternating training with respect
to the sender identification and training in order to decrease the EMD.
3.8 Evaluation of Performance
For all models email lengths of 200 (135) and 100 (70) and embeddings of different sizes (50, 60,
80, 100) were compared. The maximal accuracy to obtain because of the information contained
in the appended farewell phrase is decreased to ≈ 0.97 because a small fraction of emails had
more words than the specified threshold of 70 respectively 135. Finally, hidden size=60 was
selected for emails containing 100 words and hidden size=100 for emails with 200 words. The
corresponding comparison of learning curves is contained in the appendix. Furthermore, several
values for the differential privacy hyperparameter  were compared to each other. The table
below shows the separation of the respective data sets into train, validation and test data and
the parameter setting in terms of training.
max email len Train Validation Test Total
100 (70) 44100 18900 27000 90000
200 (135) 39200 16800 24000 80000
Table 2: Train/Validation/Test Split (0.49, 0.21, 0.3)
52
max email len batch size steps per epoch Total steps
100 (70) 70 630 12600
200 (135) 70 560 11200
Table 3: Training parameters
3.8.1 Sender Identification
The bidirectional LSTM seems to be very well able to extract the information supporting the
identification of senders. It seems a little surprising that the validation accuracy is almost twice
as high as the training accuracy. This is partly caused by the dropout layer but still a lot more
expressive than expected. However, with a value of 0.937 the test accuracy corresponds to the
validation accuracy and consequently the result seems to be correct.
Figure 30: Training and Validation Accuracy of Bidirectional LSTM
3.8.2 Basic FFN Model in Comparison to the Identificator
The difference in performance between the Basic FFN and the Identificator is quite remarkable.
The Basic FFN is capable of escaping the accuracy baseline of random guessing but is stuck at
a validation accuracy below 0.10. The corresponding test error amounts to 0.1078 and therefor
underlines the result. In contrast, the Identificator shows a rather steep learning curve with a
diminishing gap between training and validation error. With a value of 0.9173 the test error
supports the validation accuracy displayed. It can also be stated that both test accuracies, those
of the Identificator and the Bidirectional LSTM, belong to a similar range.
(a) Basic FFN (b) Identificator model
Figure 31: Overview of Training and Validation Accuracy of the Basic FFN
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3.8.3 Anonymization by Hand
To compare the results of the adversarial loss withWAtt trained with respect to sender identifica-
tion (Lid) only, the anonymization mechanism was also applied by hand. An intermediate model
was built from the before trained Identificator and the corresponding WAtt extracted. Then, a
matrix of i.i.d. Laplace noise was multiplied element-wisely with the attention matrix and the
result transformed back from vectors into words. Last, the distance of input and anonymized
output and the text quality were assessed.
Below, WAtt is visualized examplarily for both max email len values.
(a) max email len=100 (70) (b) max email len=200 (135)
Figure 32: Weight Distribution in WAtt
The visualization of WAtt illustrates the effect of the padding bias very well: All padded words
have zero weight. However, it gets furthermore obvious why the anonymization mechanism will
not work as supposed if this output is used as A. The weights are neither positive nor less than
one. The scaled matrix values after the subsequent softmax application are displayed below.
(a) max email len=100 (70) (b) max email len=200 (135)
Figure 33: Extracted Attention Output After Softmax Application
It is quite obvious that now specific parts are emphasized. However it is surprising that the
focus lies upon a specific position in each embedding vector and not on specific parts of the
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email. On the other hand, the information was at a different position in most emails. Next,
random search is performed in order to find a suitable . It seemed useful to compare the values
0.03, 0.001, 0.0001 and 0.00002 for both settings. Below, one original email with its respective
anonymized version can be seen.
Original Anonymous
[’calendar’,
’entry:’,
’appointment’,
’description:’,
’gpg’,
’united’,
’way’,
’rally’,
’-’,
’energizer’,
’date:’,
’adjustability’,
’time:’,
’3:00’,
’pm’,
’-’,
’4:00’,
’pm’,
’central’,
’standard’,
’time’,
’detailed’,
’description:’,
’would’,
’grateful’,
’would’,
’get’,
’touch’,
’blair-l’,
’soon’,
’possible’]
[’663997’,
’entry:’,
’bopper"’,
’description:’,
’knockinâ\x80\x99’,
’united’,
’way’,
’rally’,
’-’,
’onwsjcom/2hscwhs’,
’date:’,
’knockinâ\x80\x99’,
’time:’,
’12:00’,
’pm’,
’-’,
’4:00’,
’pm’,
’central’,
’663997’,
’time’,
’detailed’,
’description:’,
’would’,
’grateful’,
’would’,
’get’,
’touch’,
’bitly/2f6983y’,
’soon’,
’possible’]
Table 4: Original and Output after Application of Anonymization Mechanism (Padding Removed),  = 0.03,
max email len=100
In this example it looks like it has worked quite well. The name in the farewell phrase is replaced
but many other words are preserved. It is also worth noting that a time has been replaced by
another time. In a different example, the sender name was even replaced with the name of a
different person. The corresponding example is displayed below.
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Original Anonymous
[’got’,
’package’,
’fed’,
’ex’,
’thought’,
’would’,
’let’,
’know’,
’thanx’,
’chris’,
’faithfully’,
’dorland-c’]
[’84508’,
’package’,
’fed’,
’<u+200d>senvest’,
’thought’,
’would’,
’let’,
’schillings’,
’iosadmin’,
’chris’,
’blackout’,
’rodrique-r’]
Table 5: Original and Output after Application of Anonymization Mechanism 2 (Padding Removed),  = 0.03,
max email len=100
A replacement with the same word class is supposed to keep the data utility as high as possible.
This effect was desired from the beginning and reflected in the decision on a trained embedding.
However, the LSTM still easily identifies the senders. With  = 0.00002 the LSTM finally
struggles to identify senders in both settings.
(a) max email len=100 (b) max email len =100
Figure 34: Learning Curve of the Bidirectional LSTM on Anonymized Data ( = 0.00002).
Unfortunately, the utility suffers in a too serious manner from this level of privacy and all words
are replaced. It should additionally be remarked that only half as much data was available for
the LSTM training in comparison to the earlier Identificator training, because test data was
used in order to prevent a possible profit from any overfitting to training data. Still, with an
accuracy of less than 50%, it is possible to say that at least 2-anonymity is secured in that the
LSTM can no longer differ between two different senders. But as noted above, this anonymity
is at the cost of any visible data utility because the anonymized text does not contain many of
the previous words and no structure at all.
The training with the adversarial loss may improve the outcome.
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3.8.4 Results of the Adversarial Loss Approach
In the adversarial setting, the embedding with size 60 was again used for max email len=70,
and hidden size=100 in the case where max email len=135. The results of both settings lead to
similar conclusions and therefore only the results of the 60/70 setting are described here. All
corresponding results of the 100/135 setting are part of the appendix.
The combined model does not learn remarkably but the loss decreases at least in a little range
which may already indicate an improvement in comparison to the manual approach.
(a) =0.03 (b) =0.001
(c) =0.0001 (d) =0.00002
Figure 35: Learning Curve of the Anonymizer (max email len=70)
The Anonymizer model was then fit to test data and the output again fed to the LSTM to assess
the success of sender identification as a labelled task on the anonymized data.
It looks like the Anonymizer achieves a decrease of the LSTM’s predictive performance a lot
faster than the manual approach. At  = 0.001, after 20 epochs of training it looks like the
LSTM has already difficulties in distinguishing between 2 different senders and at  = 0.0001
10-anonymity is achieved. In the 100/135 setting, 12-anonymity is even reached at  = 0.001
already. However, the really interesting question to be answered is whether the adversarial loss
approach was better capable of preserving the text utility at the same privacy hyperparameter
. The corresponding learning curves are displayed below in fig. 36.
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(a) =0.03 (b) =0.001
(c) =0.0001 (d) =0.00002
Figure 36: Learning Curve of the LSTM on Anonymized data in the Adversarial Setting (max email len=70)
3.8.5 Comparison in Privacy-Utility-Trade-Off
The utility loss for both models under the same parameter setting is displayed below for
max email len=70.
 Manual Anonymizer
0.03 23.76 6.14
0.001 768.47 180.08
0.0001 7793 1815
0.00002 41516 9080
Table 6: Comparison of Utility Loss, Manual vs. Adversarial Approach, max email len=70
The adversarial model indeed seems to preserve a remarkable higher degree of data utility. The
remaining utility is however questionable as almost none of the previous words are preserved. In
comparison to the manual approach at  = 0.001, the replacements still appear similar messy.
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Original Manual Adversarial
[’euro-plus’,
’ajilon’,
’please’,
’note’,
’columbia’,
’navigator’,
’system’,
’unavailable’,
’every’,
’sunday’,
’11:00’,
’pm’,
’eastern’,
’monday’,
’6:00’,
’eastern’,
’routine’,
’system’,
’maintenance’,
’kind’,
’regards’,
’hodge-j’]
[’knockinâ\x80\x99’,
’knockinâ\x80\x99’,
’onwsjcom/2hscwhs’,
’blue-tick’,
’knockinâ\x80\x99’,
’knockinâ\x80\x99’,
"’mining’",
’unavailable’,
’knockinâ\x80\x99’,
’sieg’,
’pools:’,
’onwsjcom/2hscwhs’,
’onwsjcom/2hscwhs’,
’knockinâ\x80\x99’,
’25th’,
’onwsjcom/2hscwhs’,
’knockinâ\x80\x99’,
’onwsjcom/2hscwhs’,
’pools:’,
’onwsjcom/2hscwhs’,
"’mining’",
’onwsjcom/2hscwhs’,]
[’https://tco/nbxqzen6eb’,
’goggia\x92s’,
’tested\x94’,
’pop-band’,
’nt$25991’,
’outjumped’,
’ulaanbaatar’,
’foldout’,
’wwwh2oai’,
’saab’,
’??-?great’,
’non-borrowing’,
’lassman’,
’cabret\x94’,
’wwwfuturesindustryorg’,
’three-pointers’,
’whistling[1]’,
’counter-cyclical’,
’https://tco/owqvcmnu73’,
’rpt-analysis-what’,
’15166254’,
’bitly/2fzmcw6’]
Table 7: Example Comparison of Original and Anonymized Emails (max email len=70)
However, for max email len=135, more utility is kept in the adversarial approach at each 
compared to the adversarial approach with max email len=70. In contrast, the utility loss of
the manual approach increased with email length. The corresponding privacy-utility trade-off
can be seen from the below table.
 Manual Anonymizer
0.03 32.70 4.70
0.001 929.73 140.7
0.0001 9045 1410
0.00002 42890 7050
Table 8: Comparison of Utility Loss, Manual vs. Adversarial Approach, max email len=135
A reason for this behaviour is not evident. A possible reason could be the larger embedding size
that serves to capture even more contextual characteristics. The anonymized emails however look
similar distorted than for max email len=70 and also in all other respects the same conclusions
can be drawn from the results.
59
4 Summary and Discussion
First, a suitable data set for anonymization was searched for and found in the open accessible
Enron Email Data. An individual word embedding was trained in order to guarantee that all
sensitive words like names are contained and will keep their contextual similarities inside the
embedding. All emails were preprocessed in order to satisfy a standard structure. For later
comparison of predictive power between an original dataset and its anonymized equivalence,
a sender identification network was developed as a bidirectional LSTM. A second network for
sender identification, the so-called Identificator, was constructed but incorporates an attention
mechanism instead of recurrency. In order to evaluate the effect of the attention mechanism, a
third model corresponding to the Identificator without attention, was built for additional perfor-
mance comparison. Last, a model combining the Identificator with a second network, the Noiser
network that incorporates the anonymization mechanism, was developed. The corresponding
model is called the Anonymizer and enables automation of the anonymization process. The
automation works thanks to an adversarial loss function involving a privacy-utility trade-off.
Initially, the anonymization mechanism was performed manually to enable evaluation of the au-
tomated approach. In contrast to the adversarial approach, the privacy-utility trade-off does not
participate in the training process when the noise addition is applied by hand. The anonymized
outputs of both approaches were further examined in terms of remaining predictive power of the
bidirectional LSTM for sender identification.
While the manual attempt produced the intuitively desired effect of anonymization of as ob-
viously sensitive regarded data only for larger privacy budgets, too much data utility was lost
when using a small privacy budget that achieves to prevent re-identification through a bidirec-
tional LSTM. The model incorporating an adversarial loss was in each setting able to reduce
the initial utility loss but only in a small range. A great deal of data utility was lost here, too,
before the LSTM could no longer clearly identify the sender. However, in comparison to the
manual approach a remarkably higher degree of data utility was preserved and the LSTM was
already confused at a larger privacy budget.
Still, this suggests that if larger privacy budgets are used, not all sender names are exchanged in
the email text. In addition, the LSTM may in some cases identify the senders not only by a name
that can be replaced, but also by other semantic characteristics like word combinations. However,
it should be stressed that this investigation is not realistic in that an adversary will usually not
have access to labelled data. In contrast, an unsupervised setting is far more likely. Furthermore,
the embedding’s ability to reflect the context may support the LSTM in a way such that words
close to the sender name and not the name itself are sufficient for re-identification. The desired
effect of the trained embedding, namely the enablement of word vector replacements with word
vectors in their spatial proximity that are also close in a semantic sense, may also influence the
privacy in an unfavorable manner. A further step could therefore be the use of an embedding
that is trained with respect to a privacy guarantee as in [(13)]. Finally, the randomness in
differential privacy is both a curse and a blessing. On the one hand, privacy is introduced but
on the other hand randomness diminishes the ability of control. As a consequence, sensitive
attributes may be allocated little or zero noise to at random. Cryptographic terms of privacy
pose an alternative to differential privacy and are e.g. proposed as part of a GAN in [(2)].
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In conclusion, it can be said that the goal of the work was achieved to the extent that, on the one
hand, a mechanism was found that combines attention and differential privacy. Furthermore,
there were indeed settings in which utility was preserved as the replacements matched the class
of the exchanged words. On the other hand, a way was found to let the privacy-utility trade-off
actively participate in the training and thus automate the anonymization. However, there is
room for improvement in the form of a better embedding, a different anonymization mechanism
and a more successful adversarial training.
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Appendix
A Comparison of different hidden sizes
Below are the learning rates displayed to underline the decision for the selected hidden size.
(a) hidden size=50 (b) hidden size=60
(c) hidden size=80 (d) hidden size=100
Figure 37: Identificator Training with max email len=100 (70)
(a) hidden size=50 (b) hidden size=60
(c) hidden size=80 (d) hidden size=100
Figure 38: Identificator Training with max email len=200 (135)
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hidden size Model length 100 length 200
50 LSTM 0.9733 0.9555
Base FFN 0.0869 0.1001
Identificator 0.8162 0.9028
60 LSTM 0.9721 0.9686
Base FFN 0.0940 0.1078
Identificator 0.9173 0.8668
80 LSTM 0.9732 0.9699
Base FFN 0.1185 0.1251
Identificator 0.9251 0.9009
100 LSTM 0.9755 0.9657
Base FFN 0.1282 0.1183
Identificator 0.9013 0.9224
Table 9: Comparison of Test Accuracies under Different hidden sizes (Chosen Settings Marked in Yellow)
B Predictive Power of Bidirectional LSTM on Anonymized Data
B.1 Manual Procedure
(a) =0.02 (b) =0.001
(c) =0.0001 (d) =0.00002
Figure 39: Learning Curve of the LSTM on Anonymized Data (max email len=70)
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(a) =0.02 (b) =0.001
(c) =0.0001 (d) =0.00002
Figure 40: Learning Curve of the LSTM on Anonymized Data (max email len=200)
B.2 Results of the Adversarial Setting (max email len=200)
(a) =0.03 (b) =0.001
(c) =0.0001 (d) =0.00002
Figure 41: Learning Curve of the Anonymizer (max email len=200)
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(a) =0.03 (b) =0.001
(c) =0.0001 (d) =0.00002
Figure 42: Learning Curve of the LSTM on Anonymized Data in the Adversarial Setting (max email len=200)
C Proof of Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. (Laplace mechanism for documents with Attention)
Given  > 0 and n, m ∈ Z+, letMAtt : Rn → DRn×m be a mechanism that, given a matrix
X ∈ Rn×m and a matrix A ∈ Rn×m+ outputs a noisy value as
X 7→ X +A ·X ′,
where X ′ ∈ Rn×m consists of i.i.d. random numbers distributed as Lap(1 ). The product of X ′
and A is conducted element-wise. ThenMAtt satisfies min
i,j
|aij | || · ||-privacy where || · || denotes
the so-called Manhattan Metric computed as the sum of the element-wisely computed L1-norm
on Rn.
Proof. To show the respective min
i,j
|aij |dX -privacy guarantee the following must hold for any
documents X1, X2 ∈ Rn×m (especially those differing in one word only), any min
i,j
|aij | || · || ≥ 0
and a pseudometric || · ||:
MAtt(S ⊆ X )(X1)
MAtt(S ⊆ X )(X2) ≤ exp
 
min
i,j
|aij | || · || · ||X1 −X2||
 , (66)
Let X1, X2 be two matrices containing word vectors as rows. After addition of a noise matrix
containing x′ij
i.i.d.∼ Lap(1 ) and element-wise multiplication with a matrix A ∈ Rn×m as
xij 7→ xij + aij · x′ij , (67)
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each entry of the anonymized document matrix is distributed as xanonymij
i.i.d.∼ Lap(xij aij ). The
following derivation is conducted according to the earlier described proof of differential privacy
for the Laplace Mechanism in [(1)]. For z ∈ R arbitrary,
MAtt(x(1)ij , )(z)
MAtt(x(2)ij , )(z)
=
aij
2 exp
(
− |x
(1)
ij −z|
aij
)
aij
2 exp
(
− |x
(2)
ij −z|
aij
) = exp(− 
aij
(|x(1)ij − z| − |x(2)ij − z|)
)
= exp
(

aij
(|x(2)ij − z| − |x(1)ij − z|)
)
triangle ineq.
≤ exp
(
− 
aij
(|x(1)ij − x(2)ij |)
)
.
(68)
The result must somehow be transformed into an expression for the document X and not only
one entry in the document matrix. As all entries are i.i.d., the joint distribution of all entries
can be expressed as a product:
MAtt(X, )(z) =
n∏
i=1
m∏
j=1
MAtt(xij , )(z) =
n∏
i=1
m∏
j=1
aij
2 exp
(
−|xij − z|
aij
)
= exp
− n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
|xij − z|
aij
 · n∏
i=1
m∏
j=1
aij
2
(69)
This computation is only feasible as A−1 does here not correspond to the inverse of A but to
a matrix with all entries inverted: A−1 = ( 1aij )ij . The above result is then extended to the
document matrix as
MAtt(X(1), )(z)
MAtt(X(2), )(z)
=
exp
− n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
|x(1)ij − z|
aij
 · n∏
i=1
m∏
j=1
aij
2
exp
− n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
|x(2)ij − z|
aij
 · n∏
i=1
m∏
j=1
aij
2
≤ exp
 n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
|x(1)ij − x(2)ij |
aij
 ≤ exp
 n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
|x(1)ij − x(2)ij |
min
i,j
|aij |

= exp
 
min
i,j
|aij |
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
|x(1)ij − x(2)ij |

(70)
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D Electronic Appendix
Preprocessing.R
kaggledata.R
corpusgen.R
StandardLength100.R
StandardLength200.R
Balance100.R
Balance200.R
Preprocessing_Tokenization.py
DataPrep_WordVec.py
Length100.py
Length200.py
AttentionLayer.py
Padding_Bias.py
NoiseLayer.py
AttnTensor.py
Models
Basic FFN
wo_att_dim60_len100.h5
wo_att_dim100_len200.h5
Identificator
att_dim50_len100.h5
att_dim60_len100.h5
att_dim80_len100.h5
att_dim100_len100.h5
att_dim50_len200.h5
att_dim60_len200.h5
att_dim80_len200.h5
att_dim100_len200.h5
LSTM
lstm_dim60_len100.h5
lstm_dim100_len200.h5
EvalManual
lstm_anon_100_0_03.h5
lstm_anon_100_0_001.h5
lstm_anon_100_0_0001.h5
lstm_anon_100_0_00002.h5
Anonymizer100
adv_model_dim60_100_emd2_0_03.h5
adv_model_dim60_100_emd2_0_001.h5
adv_model_dim60_100_emd2_0_0001.h5
adv_model_dim60_100_emd2_0_00002.h5
Anonymizer200
adv_model_dim100_200_emd2_0_03.h5
adv_model_dim100_200_emd2_0_001.h5
adv_model_dim100_200_emd2_0_0001.h5
adv_model_dim100_200_emd2_0_00002.h5
EvalAdversarial
lstm_adv_model_dim60_100_emd2_0_03.h5
lstm_adv_model_dim60_100_emd2_0_001.h5
lstm_adv_model_dim60_100_emd2_0_0001.h5
lstm_adv_model_dim60_100_emd2_0_00002.h5
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